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Summary  
Reference price system in the Finnish pharmaceutical markets: ex ante 
policy evaluation 
The evaluation assesses the effects the reference price system is expected to have on 
the pharmaceutical markets. The effects of the reference price system is evaluated 
with the help of experiences of the generic substitution and the effects of reference 
price systems in other countries.  A framework is designed for the analysis to help in 
evaluating also the impact of other different kinds of reforms on the pharmaceutical 
markets, prices, and expenditure.  
The reference price system is introduced in Finland in circumstances where the 
generic substitution has already had significant price, market structure, and 
competition effects. In principle, the difference between the reference price system 
and the generic substitution is the incentive for consumers to respond to prices. The 
generic substitution has already produced some of the effects the reference price 
system could have produced, and therefore the expected effects should be assessed 
with relative caution.  
The reference price system can be expected to have an impact on the pharmaceutical 
prices, the market structure, competition, and the pharmaceutical total expenditure 
(see Analysis framework, Figure 1). The reference price system can influence prices 
through two routes: directly (arrow A1) or indirectly through the market structure 
(arrows A2 and A3). Direct impact means that enterprises respond to the reform by 
revising their pricing, i.e. enterprises respond by changing their prices because they 
assume that the market works differently as a result of the reform. Also the demand 
for medicines can change if the public and physicians, as a result of the reform, get 
more information about the possible alternative drugs and switch to cheaper generic 
drugs.  
The impact through the market structure is based on increasing competition, which 
leads to lower prices. It follows from the reform that generic competitors see new 
business opportunities and enter new markets with their own products. The increasing 
competition in the markets leads, then, to lower prices. The market structure can also 
depend on the prices, since new producers enter such pharmaceutical markets where the 
level of prices is high (A4). Such a market structure is endogenous (determined within 
the system), and the prices and the market structure are inter-dependent.  
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Figure 1. Analysis framework on the effects of generic substitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of price changes on the pharmaceutical total expenditure depends on the 
price and cross elasticity of demand (A5), i.e., on how the demand of a medicinal 
product changes when the price of that product changes and when the price of a 
competing medicinal product changes. Normally, a rise in the product price leads to 
a decrease in the demand for the product, while a rise in the price of a competing 
product has the opposite effect. The impact on the total expenditure depends on the 
elasticity. If the demand does not respond easily to changes in prices (a low 
elasticity), the total expenditure decreases when the prices drop, because the fall in 
prices does not lead to a corresponding rise in demand. However, if demand 
responds easily to changes in prices, the total expenditure can increase even though 
prices decrease. 
This study used a variety of statistical methods to analyse the effects of the 2003 
generic substitution on the arrows in Figure 1. As of yet there is no data on the 
effects of the Finnish reference price system. With the help of elasticity, the study 
assessed the effects the reform has had on the prices, market structure, and total 
expenditure. Also a thorough literature review was carried out on the effects of 
reference price systems in other countries.  
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The research material consisted of the quarterly medicine data for selected ATC 
groups (A02, C07, C08, C09, C10, N03, N05, N06) in 1997–2007. The medicines 
are both generic preparations and non-generic preparations. This basic material was 
used to create divisions of data suitable for various estimations. 
The generic substitution has increased competition on the pharmaceutical markets. 
Even before the generic substitution was introduced, there were more enterprises on 
the markets for medicines included in the 2003 generic substation scheme than on 
the markets for medicines excluded from the scheme. It appears that the generic 
substitution has increased the number of enterprises in the markets for active 
ingredients included in the scheme with 1–2 companies (in early 2003 the average 
was 2.5 companies). On the markets for active ingredients excluded from the generic 
substitution scheme no such changes in the number of companies has taken place. 
Before the reform, the average price of medicines included in the generic 
substitution scheme was higher than the average price of non-generic drugs.  The 
introduction of the generic substitution decreased these prices dramatically. On the 
basis of the results from the models used in the study, the price reduction was 
around 60 per cent by the end of 2007. A simultaneous evaluation of the direct effect 
of the generic substitution, on one hand, and its indirect effect through the market 
structure, on the other hand, is difficult because the variables measuring these 
effects correlate with each other, and there is a problem of multicollinearity in the 
model. When the models are estimated separately, it appears that the majority of the 
price drops were the results of direct impact and a smaller part of the price changes 
were due to indirect impact through the market structure. 
The medicine price elasticity was studied for statins and antihypertensives. For 
statins the hypothesis was that the products are substitutes. The price elasticity was 
mainly as expected. The price elasticity of demand for fluvastatins was to a degree 
contrary to the hypothesis. The absolute values of price elasticity are so small that a 
drop in the total expenditure decrease can be expected as the prices decrease.  
The evaluation of the effects of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical 
markets can be summarised as follows: 
-  According to the literature review, reference price systems have decreased 
pharmaceutical prices by 10–29 per cent in most countries.  
-  On the basis of these figures and the empirical results of the study, it can 
be assessed that the reference price system has some decreasing effect on 
pharmaceutical prices and total expenditure. The pharmaceutical prices 
decrease by 10–30 per cent and the total expenditure by 5–16 per cent.  
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Two factors especially complicate the impact analysis: Prior to the introduction of 
the reference price system, the generic substitution scheme has generated a large 
part of the effects the reference price system would have produced without the 
generic substitution. Secondly, a large part of the effects of the generic substitution 
are direct effects due to changes in the behaviour of enterprises and consumers 
instead of indirect effects through the market structure (increased competition). It is 
difficult to predict changes in behaviour, as there is too little research data on the 
pricing strategies of pharmaceutical enterprises and the prescription decisions of 
physicians in order for a proper analysis of this impact. 
The division of tasks in the research group was as follows: Aki Kangasharju is the 
responsible manager of the project. Matteo Galizzi, Simone Ghislandi, and Marisa 
Miraldo carried out the literature review on the effects of reference price systems in 
other countries. Hannu Valtonen studied the impact of generic substitution on 
competition in the pharmaceutical markets and prices (Chapter 4). Ismo Linnosmaa and 
Joni Hokkanen assessed the elasticity of cholesterol reducers and the impact of 
medicine prices on the pharmaceutical expenditure (Chapter 5). Aki Kangasharju, Ismo 
Linnosmaa and Hannu Valtonen wrote the conclusions regarding the empirical analysis 
and the literature review as well as the summary, the introduction, Chapter 2 on the 
regulations concerning the Finnish pharmaceutical markets, and the theoretical frame of 
reference in Chapter 3. The projects was financed by the University of Kuopio, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Government Institute for Economic Research, 
and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation.  
Key words: generic substitution, reference price, competition, prices, medicines, total 
expenditure 
 
 
  
Sammandrag  
 
Referensprissystemet på den finska läkemedelsmarknaden: en förhandsana-
lys av politiken 
I undersökningen bedöms referensprissystemets förväntade effekter på läkemedelsmarkna-
den. Referensprissystemets effekter bedöms med hjälp av de erfarenheter som vi har om 
läkemedelsutbytet och de effekter som referensprissystemet har haft i andra länder. För ana-
lysen skapas ett ram som kan också användas för att bedöma hur olika andra reformer på-
verkar läkemedelsmarknaden, priserna och läkemedelsutgifterna.  
Referensprissystemet införs i Finland i en situation där utbytet av läkemedel redan har haft 
betydande effekter på priserna, marknadsstrukturen och konkurrensen. Den principiella 
skillnaden mellan referensprissystemet och läkemedelsutbytet är att den förstnämnda spor-
rar konsumenterna att reagera mot priserna. Läkemedelsutbytet har redan genererat en del 
av de effekter som referensprissystemet skulle ha kunnat medföra och därför ska man vara 
relativt försiktigt med att utvärdera de förväntade effekterna.  
Referensprissystemet kan förväntas att påverka läkemedelspriserna, marknadsstrukturen, 
konkurrensen och totalutgifterna för läkemedel (Analysramen, figur 1). Referensprissyste-
met kan påverka priserna genom två vägar: som en direkt effekt (pilen A1) eller som en 
effekt genom marknadsstrukturen (pilarna A2 och A3). Den direkta effekten kommer till 
om företag reagerar mot att reformen träder i kraft genom att ändra på sin prissättning, dvs. 
företag reagerar genom att justera priserna, eftersom de förväntar att marknaden som en 
följd av reformen beter sig annorlunda. Också efterfrågan på läkemedel kan förändras när 
medborgare och läkare i och med att reformen träder i kraft får mer information om möjliga 
alternativa läkemedel och byter till billigare utbytbara läkemedel.  
Den effekt som uppstår genom marknadsstrukturen baserar sig på ökad konkurrens och dess 
prissänkande verkning. Reformen medför att generiska konkurrenter ser nya affärsmöjlighe-
ter och kommer in på marknaden med sina egna produkter. Ökad konkurrens på marknaden 
leder i sin tur till prissänkningar. Marknadsstrukturen kan påverkas av priserna eftersom det 
kan hända att mest nya producenter kommer in på marknaden av sådana läkemedel som har 
en hög prisnivå (A4). I så fall är marknadsstrukturen endogen (bestäms inom systemet), och 
då är priserna och marknadsstrukturen beroende på varandra.  
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Figur 1. Analysramen för effekterna av läkemedelsutbytet 
Prisernas inverkan på totalutgifterna för läkemedel beror i sin tur på pris- och korselasticite-
ten hos efterfrågan (A5), dvs. på hur efterfrågan på en läkemedelsprodukt förändras i och 
med priset på produkten eller priset på en konkurrerande produkt förändras. Den normala 
situationen är att efterfrågan på en produkt avtar om priset på produkten ökar och ökar om 
priset på en konkurrerande produkt går upp. Effekten på totalutgifterna beror på hur stor 
elasticiteten är. Om konsumtionen inte är särskilt känslig för prisändringar (dvs. elasticite-
ten har ett lågt absolut värde), minskar totalutgifterna när priserna sjunker eftersom prisfal-
let inte medför en jämförbar ökning i konsumtionen. Däremot om konsumtionen är känslig 
för prisändringar kan totalutgifterna öka även om priserna sjunker. 
I undersökningen estimerades med hjälp av olika slags statistiska metoder vilka effekter 
som kan förknippas med de olika pilarna i figur 1 som följd av utbyte av läkemedel som 
trädde i kraft år 2003. Uppgifter om effekterna av det finska referensprissystemet är inte 
ännu tillgängliga. I undersökningen studerades reformens effekter på priserna, marknads-
strukturen och totalutgifterna med hjälp av elasticiteten hos efterfrågan. Därtill genomfördes 
en genomgripande litteraturöversikt om hurdana effekter referensprissystemet har haft i 
olika länder. Undersökningsmaterialet består av kvartalsvis läkemedelsstatistik om utvalda 
ATC-grupper (A02, C07, C08, C09, C10, N03, N05, N06) åren 1997–2007. Läkemedlen i 
materialet var både utbytbara läkemedel och läkemedel som inte omfattas av läkemedelsut-
bytet. Ur det här basmaterialet uppbyggdes delmaterial som tillämpar till olika estimeringar. 
generisk substitution eller  
referensprissystemet
Marknadsstrukturen 
(antalet företag, 
centralisation) Priserna 
Priselasticitet hos 
efterfrågan
Totalutgifterna 
A1
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5
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Läkemedelsutbytet har ökat konkurrens på läkemedelsmarknaden. Även innan utbytet av 
läkemedel trädde i kraft fanns det mer företag på marknaden för sådana läkemedel som re-
dan år 2003 omfattades av läkemedelsutbytet än på marknaden för sådana läkemedel som 
uteslutits från läkemedelsutbytet. Det ser ut som att utbytet av läkemedel har ökat antalet 
företag på marknaden med 1–2 företag när det gäller de verksamma läkemedelssubstanser 
som omfattas av utbytet (genomsnittet var 2,5 företag vid ingången av 2003). På marknaden 
för verksamma läkemedelssubstanser som inte omfattas av utbytet skedde inga ändringar i 
antalet företag. 
Medelpriserna på läkemedel som omfattades av läkemedelsutbytet var högre före reformen 
än priserna på läkemedel som uteslutits från utbytet. Utbytet av läkemedel sänkte således 
priserna dramatiskt. Enligt resultaten för modellerna i undersökningen sjunker priserna med 
cirka 60 procent mot slutet av 2007. Det är svårt att samtidigt estimera både de direkta ef-
fekterna av läkemedelsutbytet och effekterna genom marknadsstrukturen eftersom de vari-
abler som mäter de här effekterna korrelerar och modellerna har ett s.k. multikollinearitet-
sproblem. När modellerna estimerades separat verkade det som att den största delen av pris-
sänkningar beror på reformens direkta effekter och en mindre del på ändringar i marknads-
strukturen. 
Priselasticiteten hos läkemedel estimerades för statiner och läkemedel mot högt blodtryck. 
För statiner var den grundläggande hypotesen att de undersökta läkemedlena är varandras 
substitut. Priselasticiteten beter i huvudsak som förväntad. Elasticiteten hos efterfrågan för 
fluvastatiner var i fråga om plus- och minustecknen i vissa delar motsatta till de grundläg-
gande hypoteserna. Priselasticiteten har så pass låga absoluta värden att det kan förväntas 
att totalutgifterna minskar i och med att priserna sjunker.  
Uppskattningen om hur referensprissystemet påverkar läkemedelsmarknaden kan samman-
fattas som följer: 
-  Enligt litteraturöversikten har referensprissystemet skurit ned läkemedelspri-
serna med 10–29 procent i andra länder.  
-  På basis av dessa siffror och undersökningens empiriska resultat kan det 
uppskattas att referensprissystemet minskar något läkemedelspriserna och to-
talutgifterna. Läkemedelspriserna sjunker med 10–30 procent och totalutgif-
terna med 5–16 procent.  
Speciellt två faktorer försvårar bedömningen av effekterna: Innan referensprissystemets 
ikraftträdande har läkemedelsutbytet redan genererat en del av de effekter som referenspris-
systemet skulle ha genererat utan läkemedelsutbytet. För det andra skapas den största delen 
av läkemedelsutbytets effekter direkt genom ändringar i företags och konsumenters beteen-
de och inte genom ändringar i marknadsstrukturen (ökad konkurrens). Det är svårt att förut-
se ändringar i beteendet eftersom det finns för lite forskningsmaterial om läkemedelsföre-
tags prissättningsstrategier och läkares beslutsfattande i fråga om recept för att man skulle 
kunna analysera den här effekten på ett hållbart sätt.  
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Arbetsfördelningen inom forskningsgruppen var som följer: Matteo Gallizzi, Simone Ghis-
landi och Marisa Miraldo utförde litteraturöversikten om referensprissystemets effekter i 
andra länder och Joni Hokkanen, Aki Kangasharju, Ismo Linnosmaa och Hannu Valtonen 
analyserade läkemedelsutbytets effekter på konkurrensen, priserna på och efterfrågan för 
läkemedel på basis av det finska materialet och sammanfattade den empiriska analysen och 
litteraturöversikten.  
Nyckelord:  utbyte av läkemedel, referenspris, konkurrens, priser, läkemedel, 
totalkostnader
 Tiivistelmä  
 
Viitehintajärjestelmä Suomen lääkemarkkinoilla: politiikan etukäteisana-
lyysi 
 
Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan viitehintajärjestelmän odotettavissa olevia vaikutuksia lääke-
markkinoilla. Viitehintajärjestelmän vaikutuksia arvioidaan käyttäen hyväksi kokemuksia 
lääkevaihdosta ja viitehintajärjestelmän vaikutuksista muissa maissa. Analyysia varten ra-
kennetaan kehikko, jonka avulla voidaan arvioida myös erilaisten muiden reformien vaiku-
tusta lääkemarkkinoihin, hintoihin ja lääkemenoihin.  
Viitehintajärjestelmä tulee Suomessa voimaan tilanteessa, jossa lääkevaihto on jo tuottanut 
merkittäviä hinta-, markkinarakenne- ja kilpailuvaikutuksia. Viitehintajärjestelmän periaat-
teellinen ero lääkevaihtoon on sen kuluttajille luoma hintareagoinnin kannustin. Lääkevaih-
to on jo vienyt osan niistä vaikutuksista, jotka viitehintajärjestelmä olisi voinut tuottaa ja 
siksi odotettavissa olevia vaikutuksia arvioitaessa on syytä olla kohtuullisen varovainen.  
Viitehintajärjestelmän voidaan odottaa vaikuttavan lääkkeiden hintoihin, markkinarakentee-
seen, kilpailuun ja lääkkeiden kokonaismenoihin (Analyysikehikko, kuvio 1.) Viitehintajär-
jestelmän vaikutus hintoihin voi kulkea kahta kautta: suorana vaikutuksena (nuoli A1) tai 
markkinarakenteen välittämänä (A2 ja A3). Suora vaikutus syntyy, jos yritykset reagoivat 
reformin voimaantuloon muuttamalla hinnoitteluaan, eli yritykset reagoivat muuttamalla 
hintoja, koska odottavat markkinoiden käyttäytyvän toisin reformin seurauksena. Myös 
lääkkeiden kysyntä voi muuttua, kun kansalaiset ja lääkärit reformin voimaantullessa saavat 
lisää informaatiota mahdollisista vaihtoehtoisista lääkkeistä ja siirtyvät halvempiin vaihto-
kelpoisiin lääkkeisiin.  
Markkinarakenteen kautta syntyvä vaikutus perustuu lisääntyneeseen kilpailuun ja sen hin-
toja alentavaan vaikutukseen. Reformin seurauksena geneeriset kilpailijat näkevät uusia 
liiketoiminnan mahdollisuuksia ja astuvat markkinoille kilpailemaan omilla valmisteillaan. 
Lisääntynyt kilpailu markkinoilla puolestaan johtaa hintojen alenemiseen. Markkinarakenne 
voi riippua myös hinnoista, koska uusia tuottajia voi ilmaantua eniten sellaisten lääkkeiden 
markkinoille, joilla hintataso on korkea (A4). Tällöin markkinarakenne on endogeeninen 
(järjestelmän sisällä määräytyvä), ja hinnat ja markkinarakenne riippuvat molemmat toisis-
taan.  
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Kuvio 1. Analyysikehikko lääkevaihdon vaikutuksista 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hintojen muutoksen vaikutus lääkkeiden kokonaismenoihin puolestaan riippuu kysynnän 
hinta- ja ristijoustoista (A5), eli siitä miten lääkevalmisteen kysyntä muuttuu sen oman hin-
nan muuttuessa ja jonkin kilpailevan lääkkeen hinnan muuttuessa. Normaali tilanne on, että 
oman hinnan noustessa lääkkeen kysyntä alenee ja jonkin kilpailevan lääkkeen hinnan nous-
tessa taas kasvaa. Vaikutus kokonaismenoihin riippuu joustojen suuruudesta. Jos kulutus ei 
reagoi kovin herkästi hintojen muutoksiin (eli joustojen itseisarvot ovat pienet), kokonais-
menot alenevat hintojen laskiessa, koska hinnan lasku ei johda vastaavansuuruiseen kulu-
tuksen kasvun. Jos taas kysyntä reagoi herkästi hinnanmuutoksiin, kokonaismenot voivat 
kasvaa vaikka hinnat alenevat. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa estimoitiin eri tilastollisin menetelmin vuonna 2003 voimaan tulleen 
lääkevaihdon seurauksena kuvion 1. eri nuoliin liittyvät vaikutukset. Suomalaisen viitehin-
tajärjestelmän vaikutuksia ei ole vielä saatavissa. Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin reformin vaiku-
tuksia hintoihin, markkinarakenteeseen ja kokonaismenoihin kysynnän joustojen avulla. 
Lisäksi tutkimuksen yhteydessä tehtiin perusteellinen kirjallisuuskatsaus viitehintajärjes-
telmän vaikutuksista eri maissa.  
Tutkimuksen aineisto on neljännesvuosittainen lääkeaineisto valituista ATC-ryhmistä (A02, 
C07, C08, C09, C10, N03, N05, N06) vuosilta 1997 - 2007. Lääkkeet ovat sekä vaihtokel-
poisia että lääkevaihdon ulkopuolella olevia lääkkeitä. Tästä perusaineistosta rakennettiin 
eri estimointitehtäviin soveltuvia osa-aineistoja. 
lääkevaihto tai viite-
hintajärjestelmä 
Markkinarakenne 
(yritysten lkm, 
keskittyminen) Hinnat 
 Kysynnän hintajousto 
Kokonaismenot
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
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Lääkevaihto on lisännyt kilpailua lääkemarkkinoilla. Jo ennen lääkevaihdon voimaantuloa 
yrityksiä oli enemmän sellaisten lääkkeiden markkinoilla, jotka otettiin lääkevaihdon piiriin 
vuonna 2003, kuin markkinoilla, joilla myytävät lääkkeet jäivät lääkevaihdon ulkopuolelle. 
Lääkevaihto näyttää lisänneen vaihdon piirissä olevien vaikuttavan aineen markkinoilla 
kilpailevien yritysten määrää 1-2 yrityksellä (keskiarvo vuoden 2003 alussa oli 2.5 yritystä). 
Vaihdon ulkopuolella olevien vaikuttavien aineiden markkinoilla ei ole tapahtunut muutosta 
yritysten määrässä. 
Lääkevaihdon piiriin tulleiden lääkkeiden keskihinnat olivat ennen reformia korkeammat 
kuin vaihdon ulkopuolelle jääneiden lääkkeiden. Lääkevaihto alensi näitä hintoja dramaatti-
sesti. Tämän tutkimuksen mallien tulosten perusteella hintojen aleneminen vuoden 2007 
loppuun mennessä on noin 60 prosenttia. Sekä lääkevaihdon suoran vaikutuksen että sen 
markkinarakenteen kautta kulkevan vaikutuksen yhtaikainen estimointi on hankalaa, koska 
nämä vaikutuksia mittaavat muuttujat korreloivat ja malleissa on ns. multikollineaa-
risuusongelma. Kun malleja estimoitiin erikseen, näyttää siltä, että suurin osa hintojen ale-
nemisesta johtuu reformin suorasta vaikutuksesta ja pienempi osa hintojen muutoksesta 
tulee markkinarakenteen muutoksen kautta. 
Lääkkeiden hintajoustoja estimoitiin statiini- ja verenpainelääkkeiden osalta. Statiinien osal-
ta lähtökohtaoletuksena oli, että tutkittavat lääkkeet olisivat substituutteja. Hintajoustot 
käyttäytyvät pääasiallisesti odotusten mukaisesti. Fluvastatiinien kysynnän joustot olivat 
joiltakin osin etumerkeiltään lähtökohtaoletusten vastaisia. Saatujen hintajoustojen itseisar-
vot ovat niin pieniä, että kokonaismenojen voidaan odottaa alenevan hintojen laskiessa.  
Yhteenvetona arviosta, kuinka viitehintajärjestelmä vaikuttaa lääkemarkkinoihin, voidaan 
todeta: 
-  Kirjallisuuskatsauksen mukaan viitehintajärjestelmä on alentanut lääkkei-
den hintoja muissa maissa 10-29 prosenttia.  
-  Näiden lukujen ja tutkimuksen empiiristen tulosten perusteella voidaan ar-
vioida, että viitehintajärjestelmä alentaa jonkin verran lääkkeiden hintoja 
ja kokonaismenoja. Lääkkeiden hinnat alenevat 10-30 prosenttia ja koko-
naismenot 5-16 prosenttia.  
Vaikutusten arviointia vaikeuttaa erityisesti kaksi seikkaa: Ennen viitehintajärjestelmän 
voimaantuloa lääkevaihto on jo vienyt suuren osan niistä vaikutuksista, jotka viitehintajär-
jestelmän olisi tuottanut ilman lääkevaihtoa. Toiseksi lääkevaihdon tuottamista vaikutuksis-
ta suuri osa syntyy suorana yritysten ja kuluttajien käyttäytymisen muutoksesta syntyvänä 
vaikutuksena eikä markkinarakenteen muutoksen (kilpailun lisääntymisen) kautta syntyvänä 
vaikutuksena. Käyttäytymisen muutosten ennakointi on vaikeaa, koska lääkeyritysten hin-
noittelun strategioista ja lääkäreiden lääkemääräysten päätöksenteosta on olemassa aivan 
liian vähän tutkimustietoa, jotta tätä vaikutusta voitaisiin pätevästi analysoida. 
Tutkimusryhmän työnjako oli seuraava: Aki Kangasharju on projektin vastuullinen johtaja. 
Matteo Galizzi, Simone Ghislandi ja Marisa Miraldo tekivät kirjallisuuskatsauksen viitehin-
tajärjestelmän vaikutuksesta muissa maissa. Hannu Valtonen tutki lääkevaihdon vaikutuksia 
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kilpailuun markkinoilla ja lääkkeiden hintoihin (Kappale 4). Ismo Linnosmaa ja Joni Hok-
kanen tutkivat kolesterolilääkkeiden joustoja ja lääkkeiden hintojen vaikutuksia lääkeme-
noihin (Kappale 5). Aki Kangasharju, Ismo Linnosmaa ja Hannu Valtonen kirjoittivat yh-
teenvedon empiirisestä analyysista ja kirjallisuuskatsauksesta, tiivistelmän, johdannon, 
Suomen lääkemarkkinoiden sääntelyä koskevan kappaleen 2 ja teoreettisen viitekehyksen 
(kappale 3). Hankkeen rahoittivat Kuopion yliopisto, sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, Valtion 
taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus ja Yrjö Jahnssonin säätiö.  
Asiasanat: lääkevaihto, viitehinta, kilpailu, hinnat, lääkkeet, kokonaiskustannukset 
 
 Abstract  
Finland introduced the reference pricing system to the pharmaceutical market at the 
beginning of April 2009. This paper evaluates the effects of the reform from the ex-ante 
perspective. The reform will potentially affect the prices, structure, competition and 
total expenditure of the market. This study takes all these perspectives into account in 
making an overall synthesis of the results. Evaluation is based on past Finnish 
experiences concerning the generic substitution policy, in force since 1 April 2003, and 
a literature survey of studies evaluating the effects of reference pricing abroad. 
The data include information on the number of firms selling as well as the prices and 
sales volumes of pharmaceuticals in eight ATC groups between 1997–2007, comprising 
pharmaceuticals both inside and outside the substitution scheme.  
The results indicate that generic substitution increased the number of firms in the 
pharmaceutical market. However, the effect on competition was clearly lower than that 
on prices. Generic substitution reduced prices by 60 per cent by the end of 2007. The 
literature survey suggests that reference pricing will reduce pharmaceutical prices by 
10-29 per cent. The effects are presumably country-specific, since regulation schemes 
vary over countries and reference pricing is only one part of the schemes. Since generic 
substitution has already dramatically reduced prices in Finland, we believe that the 
effect of reference pricing in Finland will be closer to the conservative estimate. Our 
results on the demand elasticities of blood pressure medicines (statines) with respect to 
changes in prices suggest that the total pharmaceutical expenditure can be expected to 
decline with declining prices. Combining all the results, we expect that the reference 
pricing will decrease prices by 10 percent and the total pharmaceutical expenditure by 5 
percent. 
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1 Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals have been continuously capturing an increasing part of total health 
costs internationally. In Finland, pharmaceuticals accounted for less than 10% of the 
total health care costs in 1990, but this figure increased to 16% by the early 2000s 
(Stakes 2007). Since then, the trend has levelled off. There are alternative explanations 
for this. One potential explanation is the system of generic substitution (GS) Finland 
introduced in April 2003. According to first estimates, generic substitution has 
generated substantial savings through increased price competition. Further policy tools 
are also being designed. Finland will adopt reference pricing (RP), where the cost of a 
pharmaceutical is reimbursed to the customer up to a reference price. Customers pay the 
costs beyond the reference price themselves. The new Reference Pricing Act will come 
into effect in April, 2009. The legislator estimates that the reform will reduce the 
expenditures of customers and taxpayers on pharmaceuticals by €35 million. 
The application of reference pricing to prescription drugs is new (Panavos and 
Reinhardt, 2003). Germany was first to introduce RP for prescription drugs in 1989, and 
was followed in Europe by the Netherlands (1991), Denmark and Sweden (1993), Spain 
(2000), and Belgium and Italy (2001). Norway adopted RP in 1993 but abandoned it in 
2001 because the expected cost savings did not materialize. Australia, the Canadian 
province of British Columbia, and New Zealand have also implemented RP.  
This study evaluates how the reference pricing is likely to affect both prices and 
expenditures of pharmaceuticals in the Finnish pharmaceutical market. The assessment 
is based on two approaches. First, a review of the existing literature on reference pricing 
and pharmaceutical policies sheds light on the issue from the perspective of other 
countries mentioned above. Second, an analysis of empirical data on Finnish 
pharmaceutical markets provides a more detailed picture of the Finnish case. Because 
the study was conducted before the reference pricing policy was introduced in Finland, 
our assessment of the policy effects is based on the economic consequences of the 
generic substitution policy.  
In the empirical part of study we construct a framework that can be used to evaluate the 
impact of the reference pricing or generic substitution policy (or, in fact, any policy 
aiming to affect pharmaceutical expenditures through price changes) on pharmaceutical 
expenditures. This framework is based on the following two-stage concept. In the first 
stage, the policy affects the prices of pharmaceutical either directly (via changes in 
firms’, consumers’ and prescribing doctors’ behaviour as a direct consequence of the 
GS reform) or indirectly through market structure (via increased competition). In the 
second stage, the resulting price change affects pharmaceutical expenditures, the 
magnitude of this effect depending on the magnitude of demand elasticities. The goal of 
the first stage is to determine whether the price impact of a policy is direct or indirect, 
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and the goal of the second stage is to estimate relevant demand elasticities and compute 
corresponding expenditure effects.  
The rest of our report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the prices and 
entry of pharmaceuticals are regulated in Finland. In particular, we discuss the policy of 
generic substitution and reference pricing. Section 3 develops a model that is used to 
analyze the interaction between the market structure and pricing in Finnish 
pharmaceutical markets. Sections 4 to 6 analyze the effects of a price change on 
pharmaceutical expenditures. The literature review is extensive. It is therefore located in 
an Appendix, and the major conclusions from it are drawn in the Conclusion section. 
The distribution of labour within the research group was as follows: Aki Kangasharju is 
the responsible director for the project. Matteo Gallizzi, Simone Ghislandi and Marisa 
Miraldo prepared the literature survey on the effects of reference pricing systems in 
other countries. Hannu Valtonen examined the effects of the generic substitution policy 
on the market structure and prices in Finnish pharmaceutical markets (Section 4). Ismo 
Linnosmaa and Joni Hokkanen estimated demand elasticities and examined the effect of 
the generic substitution policy on pharmaceutical expenditures (Section 5). Aki 
Kangasharju, Hannu Valtonen and Ismo Linnosmaa were responsible for writing the 
summary of the empirical analysis and literature review, abstract, Section 2 concerning 
the regulation of the Finnish pharmaceutical market and the theoretical framework 
(Section 3).  
2 Regulation of the Finnish pharmaceutical 
market 
2.1 The generic substitution scheme in Finland 
Finland adopted generic substitution on 1April 2003. The aim of the generic substitution 
policy is to promote cost-effective drug therapies. According to the scheme, the 
prescribed medicinal product can be replaced in a pharmacy by the cheapest, or close to 
the cheapest, generic alternative. The price of the prescribed medicine is considered to 
be close to the cheapest when the price difference to the cheapest generic alternative is 
less than €2 (for products costing less than €40) or when the price difference to the 
cheapest is less than €3 (for those costing at least €40). Substitution with a cheaper 
alternative and increased competition between pharmaceutical companies will lead to 
cost savings. The National Agency for Medicines maintains the list of substitutable 
medicinal products. Interchangeable products must contain the same active substance in 
equal amounts and pharmaceutical form and be biologically equivalent. A group of 
interchangeable products includes all generic and parallel imported products with the 
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same active ingredient (Paldan et al., 2004). Both the prescribing physician and the 
purchasing individual can forbid the substitution.  
2.2 Reference pricing 
Panavos and Reinhardt (2003) list three alternative ways patients may pay for 
prescribed drugs. First, patients may pay a fixed copayment per prescription. Secondly, 
patients may pay a fixed coinsurance of the retail price charged at the pharmacy. The 
third method is reference pricing, in which patients are responsible for the full price 
difference between the retail price and a reference price. The reference price is the price 
of a low-cost drug in a group of drugs with similar health effects.  
According to Danzon (2001), reference pricing is a reimbursement rule that sets the 
maximum reimbursement for one product by reference to the price of other 
“comparable” product(s) in the same market. Specific features that reference pricing 
systems have are:  
1. classifications of pharmaceuticals into subgroups according to therapeutic ef-
fects,  
2. the reference price as the maximum reimbursement in a subgroup, 
3. the reference price is defined using information about the price distribution of 
pharmaceuticals in each subgroup, 
4. manufacturers are free to set their prices, and 
5. patients pay the difference between the price of the drug and the reference price, 
if such difference exists.  
Germany was the first country to introduce a reference pricing policy in 1989. Other 
countries that have introduced the policy since Germany include the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, British Columbia, Australia, Italy 
and Spain (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). Danzon (2001) suggested that 
reference pricing has informally existed in generic substitution programs in the United 
Kingdom, Medicaid and managed care programmes in the US and in some Canadian 
provincial programmes, because these programmes share some of the features of the 
reference pricing system.  
A reference pricing policy may be internal or external (Danzon, 2001). An internal 
reference pricing system compares the prices of pharmaceuticals within a single 
country. External reference pricing sets the maximum reimbursement for a 
pharmaceutical by comparing the price of a pharmaceutical product in one country with 
the price of the same product in another country. Internal referencing is based on the 
comparison of prices of competing pharmaceuticals in one country, whereas external 
referencing utilizes information about the prices of the same pharmaceutical in different 
countries.  
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Finland adopted the internal reference pricing policy on 1 April 2009. The subgroups of 
pharmaceuticals in the Finnish reference pricing system are the groups of 
interchangeable products created at the time generic substitution scheme was 
introduced. The reference price in a subgroup of substitutable products is the minimum 
price + €1.5 if the minimum price is less than €40, and the minimum price + €2 if the 
minimum price exceeds €40. If the retail price exceeds the reference price, a patient 
must pay the difference between the retail price and the reference price, and the 
insurance reimbursement will be based on the reference price. If the retail price is lower 
than the reference price, the insurance reimbursement is based on the retail price 
charged at the pharmacy. 
In Finland, the price of a pharmaceutical with market authorization is not regulated if 
the price of the pharmaceutical is not reimbursed from the social insurance scheme. 
Authorities fix a reasonable wholesale price for all reimbursed pharmaceuticals. A 
reasonable wholesale price is the maximum price at which a pharmaceutical can be sold 
to pharmacies or hospitals. In other words, reimbursable pharmaceuticals are subject to 
price-cap regulation (Viscusi et al., 2005). In this respect, the Finnish system differs 
from general features of the reference pricing systems listed by Danzon (2001).  
3 Identifying the effects of a policy  
Both the generic substitution policy (GSP) and reference pricing policy (RP) aim at 
influencing pharmaceutical expenditures by fostering substitution and price competition 
among equally effective pharmaceuticals. Neither policy regulates the use or prices of 
pharmaceuticals directly, but they affect both the prices and the demand for 
pharmaceuticals indirectly through changes in market incentives.  
Direct price effects 
Figure 1 depicts the potential ways in which GSP or RP may influence pharmaceutical 
expenditures. A policy may influence the prices of pharmaceuticals either directly or 
indirectly. The price effect is direct (Arrow A1) if the pricing behaviour of firms and the 
behaviour of doctors and consumers in prescribing and buying pharmaceuticals changes 
as a result of the policy implementation. The generic substitution policy (or reference 
pricing policy) may have such an effect on prices of pharmaceuticals if it succeeds in 
fostering substitution among equally effective pharmaceuticals. Economic theory (e.g. 
Bertrand price competition model, model of perfect competition) suggests that the more 
responsive consumers are to price differences, the more fierce price competition is in 
the market (see e.g. Tirole, 1988). 
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Indirect price effects 
Price effects may also occur indirectly through a change in the market structure. If the 
GSP increases the profitability of generic entry, the policy may also affect the entry of 
new generic pharmaceuticals (Arrow 2). If the generic substitution policy increases 
price awareness and induces patients to switch from an expensive branded 
pharmaceutical to inexpensive generic drugs, the implementation of the policy may 
make generic entry more lucrative and the policy may increase generic entry.      
Figure 1. Policy effects 
 
 
 
 
 
The case in which GSP decreases the likelihood of entry can also be theoretically 
justified. In the literature on the determinants of market entry (see Berry and Reiss, 
2008, Scott Morton, 2000), the likelihood of entry depends on profitability: the higher 
(lower) the economic profit of an industry is, the more (less) likely it is that new 
entrants enter the industry. Therefore, any policy promoting substitution and price 
competition in the market may also reduce the likelihood of entry (or increase the 
likelihood of exit from a market). Potential entrants may simply consider a competitive 
market to be an unprofitable place of business. In conclusion, any policy promoting 
substitution and price competition in the market may either increase or decrease the 
likelihood of entry.    
GSP or RP 
policy 
Market structure 
(# of firms, 
concentration) Prices
 Elasticity of demand 
Expenditures
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
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Given the effect of a policy on market structure, one can then explore the impact of a 
change in market structure on the prices of pharmaceuticals (Arrow A3). Several models 
examining the impact of competition on the prices of goods (e.g. Cournot model, Model 
of perfect competition, Salop’s circle model on price competition) have concluded that 
the more competitive the market is, the lower are the prices of goods. A typical 
conclusion in the theoretical literature is that new entrants increase the supply of goods 
on the market, which tends to reduce prices.  
However, it is worth pointing out that the way competition affects prices depends on 
how sensitive consumers’ decisions are to price differences in the market. The Bertrand 
price competition model and the model of perfect competition both assume that firms 
sell perfect substitutes. In such circumstances we should expect that informed 
consumers do respond to price differences and consume only the lowest-priced good in 
the market. For various reasons, however, consumers may be less price-sensitive. The 
model developed by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) suggests that incomplete information 
about the prices of goods may be one such reason. In the literature examining 
pharmaceutical markets, Frank and Salkever (1992) analyzed a market consisting of 
price-sensitive and loyal consumers. Price-sensitive consumers respond to price 
differences in the market. Loyal consumers, on the other hand, are insensitive to price 
differences and consume only the branded pharmaceutical. The authors demonstrated 
that in such markets the entry of generic pharmaceuticals (or generic competition in 
general) may also increase the price of the branded pharmaceutical.  
One should accordingly observe that market structure may be endogenously determined 
by prices and the profitability of a market. As discussed above, the likelihood of entry is 
high in industries that earn high economic profits. High prices often imply high 
economic profits, which should increase the likelihood of entry (Arrow A4). This also 
means that the market structure in such industries may become more competitive in the 
long term. 
Prices and expenditures  
Once the impact of a policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals has been implemented, 
expenditure effects arise by the interaction between price changes and changes in the 
consumption of pharmaceuticals (Arrow A5). In the simplest case of one good, a 
reduction in the price of the good reduces expenditures on that particular good only if 
the demand for the good is inelastic with respect to a change in the price of that good. A 
good may also have substitutes and complements on the market and, hence, the change 
in the price may also influence the demand for other pharmaceuticals on the market. To 
fully examine the expenditure effects of a price change, such interconnections should be 
taken into account. This is done in Section 5 of this report.  
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4 Policy of generic substitution and prices of 
pharmaceuticals 
Our objective in this part of the study is to examine the link between pharmaceutical 
policy and the prices of pharmaceuticals. Ideally, we would like to analyse the impact of 
the Finnish reference pricing policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals using data from 
Finnish pharmaceutical markets. This, however, is currently an impossible task. 
Therefore, we utilize Finnish experiences on the effects of the generic substitution 
policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals. We fully acknowledge that the policy measures 
implemented in the generic substitution reform in 2003 differ from those measures 
intended to be implemented after the introduction of the reference pricing policy in 
Finland. We take these differences into account when drawing final conclusions about 
the effects of the policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals.  
4.1 Description of the data 
The original data were provided by the National Agency for Medicines. They consist of 
disaggregated 'packet' data, i.e. the information in the data concerns single drug packets 
with varying size and strength, and each packet of the same brand name and 
pharmacological substance appears as separate observations. In the original data we had 
more than 50 000 observations, and they comprised all pharmaceuticals in 8 three-digit 
ATC groups (see Table 1). 
For the various estimation tasks in this study, we created three different types of data set 
from the original data:  
1)   Disaggregated packet data to analyse the effect of GSP reform and competition 
on prices. 
2)   Aggregated (pharmacological substance level) data to analyse the effect of 
GSP reform on the market structure and competition. 
3)   Selected data sets for the price elasticity estimations for selected pharmacol-
ogical substances. 
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1) Disaggregated packet data 
This set of data was used to examine the effect of competition and the GSP reform on 
prices (Arrows A3 and A1 in Figure 1). 
For the analysis, we removed some of the observations in order to create quasi-
experimental data. After the observation removal, the data included two different groups 
of observations: only such pharmacological substances that were 
• non-substitutable (the ‘control’ or non-substitutable group) during the whole 
observation period (1997-2007), and  
• included in generic substitution from the implementation of the GSP reform, 
from the 2nd quarter of 2003, and that had not been excluded from the substi-
tution since then (the 'intervention' or substitutable group).  
The pharmacological substances not fulfilling these selection criteria were removed 
from data. After the removal, we had 27 771 observations in the data. In some of the 
later analyses, there are some missing observations.     
Table 1. The ATC groups in the data, 44 quarters over 11 years from 1997 to 2007 
ATC 
 Substitutable, 
N 
Non-substitutable,  
N 
Total, 
N 
A02 
DRUGS FOR ACID RELATED DIS-
ORDERS  
 
790 961 1751 
C07 BETA BLOCKING AGENTS; 958 1651 2609 
C08 CALCIUM CHANNEL BLOCKERS; 3104 777 3881 
C09 
AGENTS ACTING ON THE RENIN-
ANGIOTENSIN SYSTEM; 
 
883 3685 4568 
C10 LIPID MODIFYING AGENTS; 531 2717 3248 
N03 ANTIEPILEPTICS;   2354 2354 
N05 PSYCHOLEPTICS; 4349 478 4827 
N06 PSYCHOANALEPTICS; 1620 2913 4533 
Total  14589 13182 27771
 
The data contain 325 different branded drugs, 121 pharmacological substances over 44 
time periods (quarters, i.e. 11 years) from the 1st quarter of 1997 to the 4th quarter of 
2007, from eight (three-digit) ATC groups (A02, C07, C08, C09, C10, N03, N05, N06), 
and 79 different firms. The panel is unbalanced, since some new substances have 
entered the market and some have left (see Appendix 2.). Most of the drugs (75% in the 
4th quarter of 2007) are prescription drugs. 
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2) Aggregated (pharmacological substance level) data 
This data set was used to analyze the impact of the GSP reform on market structure and 
competition. The measure for competition is the number of firms in the market. 
For the analysis of the effect of the GSP reform on market structure and competition 
(Arrow A2 in Figure 1), the previous data set was aggregated over pharmacological 
substances. This was done because the 'markets' were defined in this part of the study as 
a pharmacological substance market. The firms were assumed to compete with each 
other within markets defined by pharmacological substances. After the aggregation, the 
data for market structure evaluation were panel data comprising 3543 observations, and 
same 121 pharmacological substances over 44 time periods (quarters, i.e. 11 years) from 
the 1st quarter of 1997 to the 4th quarter of 2007, from eight (three-digit) ATC groups 
(A02, C07, C08, C09, C10, N03, N05, N06).   
 
3) Selected data sets for the price elasticity estimations  
The third type of data set was formulated from the original data by choosing selected 
pharmacological substances (separate data sets for both statins and beta-blockers) for 
the analysis. From these selected substances, brand name (original or market leaders 
with large markets shares in the 1st period in our data) drugs and generic competitors 
were identified, where this was feasible. If the original drug could not be identified, a 
market leader was identified instead. The generic competitors (prices and quantities) 
were aggregated as one 'generic competitor'. The DDD prices for each time period were 
calculated as weighted averages (market shares as weights). In the price elasticity 
analyses, data from several time periods are needed for original and generic 
competitors, and thus drugs that either had no generic competition or were in the data 
only for some time periods were excluded from the data. From these data, the variables 
needed in the analysis, the market share of the original drug and the relative prices were 
calculated. 
4.2 Empirical models 
We next present the empirical models that we employ to examine both direct and 
indirect effects of the policy of generic substitution. 
4.2.1 Effect of the GS policy on market structure  
Our theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 1, which is reproduced with some 
modifications in Figure 2. In this section, we focus on the variables inside the rounded 
rectangle in Figure 2 and raise two questions concerning the price effects of the generic 
substitution policy. We first aim to quantify the direct effect that the policy has had on 
the prices of pharmaceuticals (Arrow 1) on Finnish pharmaceutical markets. Secondly, 
we examine the effect of the policy on prices through market structure. The second task 
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(Arrow 2) and then the impact of the market structure on the prices of pharmaceuticals. 
In the latter part, we also discuss the potential problem of an endogenous market 
structure.  
Figure 2. Generic substitution policy and prices of pharmaceuticals 
 
Our first interest is in the effect of the generic substitution policy on the market 
structure (Arrow 2 in Figure 2). For this purpose, we consider the following empirical 
model: 
 
1) g(FIRMSgt) = f(θ0 + θg + θ1GSgt + θ2GSgt*(TIME-25)+ θ3SUBSg + θ4TIME + 
θ5SALESgt-1) 
where the variable FIRMSgt is the number of firms selling pharmaceuticals with 
pharmacological substance g in time period t. The variable SALESgt-1 is the total sales in 
group g (pharmacological substance g), measured in wholesale prices and lagged by one 
period. The literature examining market entry (see e.g. Berry and Reiss (2008) and 
Scott-Morton (2000)) suggests that post-entry profits determine the market structure, 
because they influence the likelihood of entry (Arrow A4 in our model). The SALESgt-1-
 
 
 
 
26
variable approximates average profits. The parameter θ0 is the constant term and the 
variable θg captures persistent differences across pharmaceuticals in different 
pharmacological groups. The TIME variable captures the time trend in the data. 
The variable GSgt is defined as the product GSPt*SUBSg, where the dummy variable 
GSPt obtains a value of zero before the implementation of the generic substitution 
policy (25th quarterly time-point in our data) and a value of 1 otherwise. We treat GSgt 
as the reform variable of interest. The variable SUBSg obtains a value of 1 if 
pharmacological group g contains pharmaceuticals to which the generic substitution 
policy is being applied (henceforth substitutable pharmaceuticals), and a value of 0 if 
the group does not contain such pharmaceuticals. The latter types of groups form the 
control group in our study. The variable SUBSg was included in the model in order to 
control for time-independent differences between the pharmaceuticals in the 
intervention and control groups.  
We estimate the log-linear and the Poisson specification of the above model 1). In the 
log-linear specification we specify g(FIRMSgt) as ln(FIRMSgt) and f(wgt) = wgt + εgt, εgt 
is normal error term. In addition, we apply the Poisson model in order to capture the 
discrete (count data) nature of the dependent variable. The variable FIRMSgt is a count 
measure for the number of firms in marketg.  
4.2.2 Price effects  
We then concentrate on examining the price effects of the generic substitution policy. 
We are interested in finding both the direct effect of the generic substitution policy on 
the prices of pharmaceuticals (Arrow 1 in Figure 2) and also the effect that arises 
through a change in the market structure (Arrow A3 in Figure 2). In order to accomplish 
this, we construct a log-linear empirical model in which prices of pharmaceutical 
products are explained by variables measuring market structure and the time the generic 
substitution policy was implemented. In particular, our interest is in the following log-
linear model: 
 
2) ln(PRICEigt) = α0 + αi + α1GSgt + α2 GSgt*(TIME-25)+ α3SUBSg + γ1TIME + 
β1FIRMSgt-1 + εitg 
where PRICEigt is the price of pharmaceutical product i in pharmacological group g in 
time period t. A log-linear model is estimated, because log-transformed prices better 
satisfy the standard model assumption that the stochastic terms of the model εitg follow a 
normal distribution. The parameter α0 is the constant term and the variable TIME is a 
linear time trend. The variable αi captures persistent and time-independent differences 
across the prices of pharmaceutical products. In this respect, we estimate both the fixed- 
and random-effects specifications of the model. Because the prices and market structure 
 
 
 
 
27
in period t may be jointly determined, we explain prices in time period t by the number 
of firms in the previous time period t-1.  
The variable GSgt is defined as the product GSPt*SUBSg. The variable SUBSi obtains a 
value of 1 if pharmaceutical i belongs to the class of pharmaceuticals to which the 
generic substitution policy is being applied, and a value of 0 if pharmaceutical does not 
belong to this class. The generic substitution policy does not affect pharmaceuticals that 
are not classified as substitutable pharmaceuticals. Such pharmaceuticals form the 
control group in our study. We also include the variable SUBSg in the model in order to 
control for potential price differences between the pharmaceuticals in the intervention 
and control groups.  
Economic theory suggests that the degree of product market competition and costs of 
production influence the prices of goods. The variable FIRMSgt is assumed to measure 
the degree of product market competition. We have no data on the costs of producing 
pharmaceuticals and, therefore, we assume that the variable αi captures the cost-related, 
time-invariant differences across pharmaceutical products.    
In order to examine the price effects of the generic substitution policy, we estimate 
three specifications of model 2). In the first specification we examine the effect of the 
generic substitution policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals. This is done by assuming 
that the market structure has no influence on the prices of pharmaceuticals, and β1 = 0. 
If this assumption holds true in general, the generic substitution policy has only direct 
effects on the prices of pharmaceuticals (as indicated by Arrow 1 in Figure 2). In the 
second specification we assume that any effects that the policy has on the prices of 
pharmaceuticals arise through a change in the market structure, and α1 = α2 = α3 = 0. If 
this assumption holds true in general, the price effects of the policy arise only through 
changes in the market structure. Finally, we also estimate the model as it appears in 
equation 2). The general form allows both direct and indirect effects (both Arrow 1 and 
Arrow 3 in Figure 2) to exist simultaneously.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 The generic substitution policy and market structure 
Our first goal is to quantify the effect of the policy on the degree of competition in the 
market, which is measured by the number of competing firms selling drugs containing 
the same pharmacological substance.   
Construction and characteristics of the data 
The generic substitution (= GSgt) variable was constructed as a 'treatment' variable. The 
variable obtains a value of zero before the beginning of the second quarter in 2003, and 
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after that the variable obtains a value of 1 for those substances that were substitutable 
and a value of 0 for those that were not substitutable. To be able to better observe the 
effect of the reform on competition, we removed from the data those substances that 
became substitutable later than at the beginning of the second quarter in 2003. 
Table 2. Variables in the models 
Variable N Mean Std.dev. Min Max
  
FIRMS (= No. of firms) 3543 1.777 1.705 1 14
ln(FIRMS) 3543 0.345 0.582 0 2.639
TIME 3543 23.327 12.333 2 44
GS 3543 0.143 0.350 0 1
Substitutable (= SUBS) 3543 0.289 0.454 0 1
GS*TIME 3543 1.462 4.141 0 19
SALESt-1 3543 7.179 22.563 1.47E-05 269.1
 
The number of firms can be seen as count data (having only non-negative integer 
values: 1, 2, 3, etc.), and thus should be modelled using Poisson or negative binomial 
models. Moreover, the variable describing the number of firms has a skewed 
distribution (mean is 2.1, the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 14). The chosen 
modelling strategy was as follows: The number of firms (in logarithmic form to correct 
the skewedness of the distribution) was modelled by random-effect regression with the 
marketing authorization number as the group variable, after testing the specification 
against a fixed-effect model using the Hausman test. Secondly, the number of firms was 
modelled using Poisson models.  
By modelling the competition in these ways, we assume that the firms compete in 
markets defined by pharmacological substances (active substances). In other words, we 
assume that products with the same pharmacological substances are substitutes, and 
their demand may depend on each others’ prices (cross-price elasticities are not zero).  
The GSP reform can potentially change the market structure by opening new business 
opportunities in the market. The business opportunities are determined by the size of the 
market and the generic substitution reform. As discussed in Section 3, the reform might 
cause a change in the number of competitors, and it might also affect time trend in the 
number of competitors in each substance market.  
Results 
A larger number of firms were found to be marketing those drugs that later, with the 
introduction of generic substitution, became substitutable (see Figure 1). The average 
number of firms was above 2 in the substitutable group, whereas in the non-
substitutable group it was less than 1.5. After the GSP reform the number of competitors 
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increased, but towards the end of 2007 the number of competitors appears to have 
declined. There appears to have been a small declining trend in the non-substitutable 
group. 
Figure 3. Number of firms in the intervention and control groups (GS = the implemen-
tation of the generic substitution reform) 
 
According to Figure 3, the variation in the number of competing firms in the 
substitution (= intervention) group appears to be larger than in the non-substitution (= 
control) group, and the variation in the number of competing firms appears to be 
increasing over time in the substitution group.  
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Table 3. The number of firms in the substitution and non-substitution groups 
  
Time  Non-substitution group Substitution group 
    
Year 2003, 
2nd quartal 
 
Mean 1.27 2.52 
 Std.dev 0.69 1.85 
 Coefficient of variation 54.3 73.5 
    
Year 2007, 
4th quartal 
 
Mean 1.24 4.03 
 Std.dev 0.60 3.31 
 Coefficient of variation 48.3 82.1 
 
When estimating the effect of the GSP reform on the market structure, both sets of 
models (linear and count data models) produce similar results. The generic substitution 
increases the number of competitors, but, as we can see from Figure 3, this effect might 
not be caused only by the reform itself. The number of firms in the substitution group is 
increasing already before the GSP reform. However, the reform seems to cause an 
increasing trend over time. In comparison to the control group (outside generic 
substitution), the substitutable drugs have more competitors and the number of 
competitors is increasing in time. Of the variables included in model 1), the size of the 
market (lagged sales) has a positive sign, that is, the number of firms increases with the 
size of the market, as expected.   
 
 
 
 
 
31
Table 4. The effect of the GSP reform on the market structure  
 
Dependent variable: number of firms within pharmacological substance markets 
 
Random-effects 
regression (robust 
standard errors) on 
ln(FIRMS) 
Fixed-effects 
regression  
(robust standard 
errors) on 
ln(FIRMS) 
Random effects 
Poisson regression 
on FIRMS  
Fixed effects 
Poisson re-
gression on 
FIRMS  
N 3543  3543  3543  3543  
No. of pharma-
cological sub-
stances 114  114  114  114  
         
R2:         
within 0.532  0.532      
between 0.292  0.288      
overall 0.459  0.458      
         
 Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
         
TIME -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002  -0.002  
GS 0.301 *** 0.303 *** 0.316 *** 0.313 *** 
GS*(TIME-25) 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 
SALESt-1 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 
Constant 0.166 *** 0.235 *** 0.277 ***   
         
σu 
0.330  0.372      
σe 
0.229  0.229      
 
When we take into account that the number of competitors is already higher in the 
substitutable group before the generic substitution reform, we model it with a dummy 
variable 'substitutable' (1 if substitutable and 0 if non-substitutable for all time periods). 
This variable can only be included in the random effect models, and is not statistically 
significant in either of the models (see Table 5). This might be caused by the large 
variation in the number of competitors in the substitutable group. 
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Table 5. The effect of the GS policy on the market structure 
 
Dependent variable: number of firms in the pharmacological substance markets 
 
Random-effects 
regression (robust 
standard errors) 
on  
ln(FIRMS) 
Fixed-effects regres-
sion (robust stan-
dard errors) on 
ln(FIRMS) 
Random effects 
Poisson regres-
sion on FIRMS 
Fixed effects 
Poisson regres-
sion on 
FIRMS 
N 3543  3543  3543  3543  
No. of pharmacol-
ogical substances 114  114  114  114  
         
R2:         
within 0.532  0.532      
between 0.294  0.288      
overall 0.460  0.458      
         
 Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
         
TIME -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002  -0.002  
SUBS 0.008  na.  0.169  na.  
GS 0.300 *** 0.303 *** 0.296 *** 0.313 *** 
GS*(TIME-25) 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.039 *** 0.040 *** 
SALES,t-1 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 
Constant 0.164 *** 0.235 *** 0.225 ***   
         
σu 
0.358  0.372      
σe 
0.272  0.229      
         
 
According to the estimation results in Table 5, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the number of firms between the intervention and control groups. 
However, the GS policy reform seems to have a clear effect on the number of 
competitors in this model. We also find a significant time trend.    
In practice, the scale of the effects can easily be evaluated from the linear models: the 
coefficients are elasticities. They express the relative change in the explanatory variable 
(number of firms in the markets) after the generic substitution is implemented. The 
coefficient of the GS variable is around 0.3, and thus the implementation of generic 
substitution increased the number of firms in the substitution group by 30 per cent. The 
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time trend implies an annual 3 per cent increase in the number of competitors as a 
consequence of the GSP reform. The average number of competitors in the substitution 
group in period 26 was 2.52, and thus a 30 per cent increase in this would correspond to 
0.7 to 0.8 firms. The effect of the time trend over four years (12 quarters) would be an 
increase of 50 to 60%, that is an addition of 1.3 - 1.5 firms from the starting value of 2.52. 
In the Poisson models, the estimated equation expresses the values of ln(expected value 
of the variable) as a linear function of the explanatory variables. Thus, the estimated 
effect of the GS reform is around 34-37 per cent (exp(.296),exp(.313)). The effect of the 
time trend over four years would be an increase of around 60 per cent in the number of 
competitors. Both model types produce similar estimates for the size of the effect of the 
GSP reform on the market structure. 
4.3.2 Price effects 
We first study the direct effect of the GS policy on prices. The data comprise 27 104 
different packets (products having a market authorisation number). Only packets that 
were either substitutable or non-substitutable at the time of the implementation of the 
GSP were included in the data. This selection was carried out so we that could better 
analyse the impact of the reform. Pharmaceuticals that later became substitutable are 
left out of this data set. We thus have 121 different pharmacological substances, 44 
quarters and a total of 1408 products in the data. The price variable was calculated from 
the total sales in wholesale prices by dividing this by the quantity of packages sold. The 
price thus represents wholesale prices per packet. 
  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics on the prices of drugs (€/packet) 
  
  non-substitutable substitutable 
    
Before GSP    
 N 8938 4532 
 Mean 24.9 38.8 
 Std.dev. 38.3 36.3 
 Coefficient of variation 153.5 93.7 
    
After GSP    
 N 5651 8650 
 Mean 34.9 22.6 
 Std.dev. 50.6 25.2 
 Coefficient of variation 145.0 111.3 
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It appears that the prices of pharmaceuticals that later became substitutable were higher 
before the GS policy reform (Table 6 and Figure 4). After the reforms, the prices 
declined, but their variation increased (see coefficient of variation). The prices of non-
substitutable pharmaceuticals appeared to increase after the GS reform. 
 
Figure 4.  Mean prices in the intervention and control groups  
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics, N = 27104 
  
Variables Mean Std. dev Min Max 
     
PRICE 28.34 38.19 0.53 606.0 
ln(PRICE) 2.74 1.11 -0.64 6.41 
GS 0.31 0.46 0 1 
GS*TIME 3.43 5.85 0 19 
TIME 24.85 12.77 1 44 
SUBS 0.48 0.50 0 1 
FIRMS 3.61 3.13 1 14 
 
The price variable is skewed to the right, and the logarithmic transformation was used in 
all models. The benefit of this is that the coefficients in the models express the size of 
the relative (percentage) change in the prices.   
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The direct effect of the GS policy reform on prices 
We first examine the direct effect of the GS policy on the prices of pharmaceuticals and 
estimate model 2) under the constraint β1 = 0. Table 8 displays the estimation results. 
The first two models are regular panel data models. In the third model (Prais-Winsten 
model) the auto-correlation and potential panel-level heteroscedasticity of the 
observations are taken into account. 
Table 8. The direct effect of the GS reform on prices (log) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(PRICE) 
 
Fixed-effects regression 
(robust standard errors) 
Random effects 
regression (robust 
standard errors) 
Prais-Winsten regression with 
AR(1) error terms (heterosce-
dastic panels and corrected 
standard errors terms) 
N 27700  27700  27700  
No. of groups 1408  1408  1408  
       
R2:       
within 0.421  0.421    
between 0.029  0.047    
overall 0.022  0.064  0.646  
       
corr(u_i,Xb) -0.103      
       
 Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
       
GS 0.127 *** 0.126 *** -0.040 *** 
GS*TIME -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.062 *** 
TIME -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.005 *** 
SUBS n.a.  0.359 *** 0.478 *** 
Constant 2.924 *** 2.748 *** 2.713 *** 
       
σu 
1.092  1.028    
σe 
0.205  0.205    
ρ 
    0.976  
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In all of the models, the reform causes a downward trend in the prices. The size of the 
effect is 5 - 6 per cent per year. In the first two models, which do not control for auto-
correlation, the GS reform seems to have an increasing effect on prices, about 13 per 
cent. In the autoregressive model, on the other hand, the policy causes a small 
downward shift. The third model is the most appropriate one for final conclusions due 
to auto-correlated disturbance terms (see the estimate for ρ in Table 8). Those 
pharmaceuticals that later became substitutable were more expensive than those that 
were left outside the substitution.  
The effect of competition on prices 
We then examine the effect of competition on prices by estimating model 2) under the 
constraints α1 = α2 = α3 = 0. The distribution of the number of firms is again skewed 
towards the right. In fact, in 63 per cent of all observations, the number of competing 
firms is three or less (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics on the FIRMS variable 
 
FIRMS Freq. % 
   
1 8788 32.3 
2 5327 19.6 
3 3047 11.2 
4 2300 8.5 
5 1721 6.3 
6 1474 5.4 
7 1435 5.3 
8 526 1.9 
9 621 2.3 
10 253 0.9 
11 265 1.0 
12 927 3.4 
13 408 1.5 
14 83 0.3 
   
Total 27175 100.0 
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Table 10. The effect of exogenous competition on prices (log) 
 
Dependent variable: ln(PRICE) 
 
Fixed effects re-
gression (robust 
standard errors) 
Random effects 
regression (robust 
standard errors) 
Prais-Winsten regression 
with AR(1) error terms ( 
heteroscedastic panels and 
corrected standard errors) 
No obs. 26608  26608  26608  
No. groups 1375  1375  1375  
       
R2:       
Within 0.313  0.313    
Between 0.050  0.050    
Overall 0.028  0.028    
       
corr(u_i,Xb) -0.130      
       
   Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
 Coef. P>|t|     
FIRMSt-1 -0.094 *** -0.093 *** -0.036 *** 
TIME -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.009 *** 
Constant 3.215 *** 3.241 *** 3.142 *** 
       
σu 
1.079  1.028    
σe 
0.226  0.226    
ρ 
    0.977  
 
In the three models estimated above we have assumed that competition is exogenous, 
i.e. given to the model. Technically, this is done by using lagged values of the FIRMS 
variable. According to the results in Table 10, competition lowers the prices. One 
additional firm reduces the prices by from 3 to 9 per cent. There is also a small 
declining trend over time. In the model in which autocorrelation is accounted for, the 
effect of increased competition is smaller than in the other two models. 
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GS reform and competition effects together 
When estimating the full model 2), we meet the multicollinearity problem. The GSP 
reform variables (dummy and time trend) correlate strongly with the competition 
variable. The number of firms increases after the GSP reform, and the correlation with 
time and the GSP reform dummy is quite high. Consequently, the independent effects of 
these variables, i.e. the magnitudes of their independent effect on prices, are difficult to 
identify. 
 
Table 11. The correlation matrix of the potential explanatory variables 
 
 GS GS*(Time-25) Time No. firms SUBS 
GS 1     
GS*TIME 0.87 1    
TIME 0.59 0.62 1   
FIRMS 0.71 0.71 0.44 1  
SUBS 0.71 0.61 0.28 0.58 1 
 
If we estimate the full model (despite the difficulties), we find that the effect of the GSP 
reform seems to be similar to that in the previous models, and the effect of competition 
seems to be somewhat smaller than in the previous models. 
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Table 12. The effect of competition (number of firms) on prices (log) 
 
 
Fixed effects re-
gression (robust 
standard errors) 
Random effects 
regression ( ro-
bust standard 
errors) 
Prais-Winsten regression with 
AR(1) error terms (heteroscedas-
tic panels and corrected standard 
errors) 
N 27104  27104  27104  
No. of 
groups 1382  1382  1382  
       
R2:       
within 0.447  0.447    
between 0.045  0.080    
overall 0.029  0.086  0.661  
       
corr(u_i,Xb) -0.121      
       
 Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
GS 0.170 *** 0.170 *** -0.040 *** 
GS*TIME -0.051 *** -0.051 *** -0.063 *** 
TIME -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.007 *** 
FIRMSt-1 -0.035 *** -0.036 *** -0.014 *** 
SUSB n.a. *** 0.452 *** 0.526 *** 
Constant 3.012 *** 2.809 *** 2.700 *** 
       
σu 
1.084  0.995    
σe 
0.202  0.202    
ρ 
    0.971  
 
To overcome the multicollinearity problem, we estimated these models separately for 
the substitution and non-substitution group, and included the competition variable and 
time as a set of dummy variables in the model. The idea is that the competition variable 
catches the effect of competition and time dummies all other effects than competition, 
including the time trend and the effect of the GSP reform. This model does not suffer 
from multicollinearity. 
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Table 13. The effect of competition (number of firms) and time on prices (log)  
  Non-substitution group Substitution group 
N 14220  12884  
No. of groups 618  764  
     
R2 :     
within 0.037  0.532  
between 0.130  0.177  
overall 0.011  0.205  
     
corr(u_i,Xb) -0.128  0.088  
     
 Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
FIRMS 0.000  -0.040 *** 
Quartals     
from the 1st quartal to the 
20th quartal no statistically 
significant coefficients     
21 0.000  0.056 * 
22 0.000  0.053 * 
23 0.005  0.099 *** 
24 0.006  0.076 ** 
25 0.007  0.101 *** 
Implementation of GS, 26 -0.003  0.035  
27 0.010  0.017  
28 0.018  -0.002  
29 0.023 * 0.026  
30 0.021 * -0.003  
31 0.012  -0.040 * 
32 -0.014  -0.142 *** 
33 -0.011  -0.183 *** 
34 -0.014  -0.216 *** 
35 -0.013  -0.249 *** 
36 -0.016  -0.319 *** 
37 -0.063 *** -0.435 *** 
38 -0.071 *** -0.517 *** 
39 -0.093 *** -0.605 *** 
40 -0.071 *** -0.668 *** 
41 -0.068 *** -0.662 *** 
42 -0.067 *** -0.681 *** 
43 -0.062 *** -0.694 *** 
44 -0.069 *** -0.705 *** 
Constant 2.656 *** 3.302 *** 
     
σu 
1.247  0.892  
σe 
0.129  0.254  
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 The results in Table 13 show that competition does not have an effect on prices in the 
substitution group. There is a small statistically significant declining trend in the prices 
after quarter 37 (from the beginning of 2006). In the substitution group, however, 
competition seems to have a small price effect. If one extra firm enters the market, the 
prices decline by about 4 per cent. From 1997 onwards to the 20th quarter there are no 
statistically significant time effects. However, in a few periods before the GSP reform 
the prices are increasing. It might be the case that the firms are preparing for the reform 
by increasing their prices. After the implementation of the GSP reform there is a clear 
time trend, with prices starting to decline quite rapidly.  
When we compare the relative size of the direct price effect and the effect via 
competition, the direct GS reform effect is larger in size. This can be interpreted to 
mean that in the existing markets both the pharmaceutical firms and the consumers 
changed their behaviour, and the change in prices due to this behavioural change were 
larger than the price effects arising via increased competition.  
5 Effect of a change in prices on 
pharmaceutical expenditures 
According to the literature review (see Appendix), the implementation of the reference 
pricing system has reduced prices by from 10% to 29% in countries that have adopted 
the system. In the previous section we estimated that the generic substitution policy 
reduced wholesale prices of pharmaceuticals by 5-6% per year in Finland. In this part of 
the study we examine the impact of a price change on pharmaceutical expenditures 
(Arrow 5 in Figure 5). This effect depends on the demand elasticity of pharmaceuticals. 
In this section we first estimate demand elasticities and then assess the change in 
pharmaceutical expenditures that is caused by a certain reduction in the prices of 
pharmaceuticals.  
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Figure 5. Prices and expenditures  
 
5.1 Impact of prices on pharmaceutical expenditures 
The standard demand analysis suggests that a reduction in the price of a pharmaceutical 
will increase (decrease) pharmaceutical expenditures, if the demand for the 
pharmaceutical is price elastic (inelastic). A reduction in the price has no impact on 
pharmaceutical expenditures if the demand for the pharmaceutical is unit elastic. This 
relationship between price and pharmaceutical expenditures is illustrated below in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Price change and pharmaceutical spending 
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The demand for pharmaceutical is inelastic at price p1. In this case, a reduction in price 
of the pharmaceutical will reduce pharmaceutical expenditures. On the other hand, at 
price p3 the demand for the pharmaceutical is elastic and a reduction in the price of the 
pharmaceutical will increase pharmaceutical expenditures. In case of the unit elastic 
demand, at the price level p2, a price change has no impact on pharmaceutical 
expenditures.  
The effect of price on expenditures can also be expressed formally. In order to formalize 
the concept in Figure 1, we consider the demand for pharmaceutical i. We first assume 
that the demand for pharmaceutical i depends only on its own price pi. Let us denote the 
demand for pharmaceutical i as qi(pi) and assume that the demand decreases strictly 
when the price of pharmaceutical i increases. Pharmaceutical expenditures on 
pharmaceutical i are given by Ei(pi) = piqi(pi). The effect of a change in the price pi on 
pharmaceutical expenditures can be computed as 
 
3) dEi(pi)/dpi = qi(pi)(1 + εii),      
where εii ≡ (dqi/dpi)(pi/qi) is the elasticity of the demand for pharmaceutical i with 
respect to its own price pi. According to equation (1), a reduction in the price of 
pharmaceutical i will reduce (increase) pharmaceutical expenditures if the demand for 
pharmaceutical i is inelastic (elastic). In case of unit elastic demand, price pi has no 
effect on pharmaceutical expenditures.  
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Instead of absolute changes, it may be more convenient to examine the elasticity of 
pharmaceutical expenditures i with respect to a change in price i. This elasticity can be 
computed as follows:  
 4) [dEi(pi)/dpi][pi/E(pi)] = qi(pi)(1 + εii)[pi/Ei(pi)] = 1 + εii.  
The intuition of the above paragraph applies similarly to the above equation.  
In the above discussion, we have examined one pharmaceutical product by assuming 
that a change in the price of pharmaceutical i affects the demand for pharmaceutical i 
only. This may not be a realistic approach in practice, because pharmaceutical products 
often have substitutes (and perhaps also complements) on the market. The market for 
lovastatins provides one example. The branded pharmaceutical in the market is 
Mevacor. In addition, the market for lovastatins consists of several generic substitutes 
competing with Mevacor. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that a change in the price 
of Mevacor will also affect the demand for generic substitutes on the market.  
Let us consider a pharmaceutical market with n pharmaceuticals. The demand for 
pharmaceutical i = 1,2,...,n is denoted by qi(p), where the variable p = (p1,p2,...,pn) 
contains the prices of all pharmaceutical products on the market. Expenditures on n 
pharmaceuticals on the market are defined as E(p) = Σipiqi(p). The effect of a change in 
price pi on pharmaceutical expenditures is given as: 
 
5)  dE(p) = [piqi(p)(1 + εii) + Σj≠i pjqj εji] dpi/pi   
where εji ≡ (∂qj/∂pi)(pi/qj) is the cross-price elasticity of demand for pharmaceutical j 
with respect to price pi. If one allows all prices to change simultaneously, the resulting 
change in pharmaceutical expenditures is  
 
6)  dE(p) = ∑i [piqi(p)(1 + εii) + Σj≠i pjqj εji] dpi/pi.   
We use equation (6) to compute the effect of a price change on pharmaceutical 
expenditures.  
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5.2 Empirical model 
As the above section demonstrates, information on the demand elasticity of 
pharmaceuticals is needed in order to evaluate the impact of a price change on 
pharmaceutical expenditures. At minimum, one would like to have reliable estimates of 
the own-price elasticities. Moreover, depending on the scope one uses to define a 
pharmaceutical market, it may also be necessary to gather information on cross-price 
elasticities.   
In order to estimate demand elasticities, we apply the empirical model developed by 
Ellison et al. (1997). Their model can be used to estimate both own-price elasticities of 
demand and cross-price elasticities of demand. The demand for a pharmaceutical 
product is determined in a two-stage process, in which a physician first decides which 
pharmaceutical is to be prescribed and, conditional on the choice of a pharmaceutical, 
the physician or a patient (or even a pharmacist) decides whether the patient ends up 
using the branded or a generic version of the pharmaceutical. Following Ellison et al. 
(1997), we call the first level demand model the top-level equation and the second level 
demand model the bottom-level equation. 
At the bottom level, the market shares of branded and generic versions of 
pharmaceuticals (with a given active agent) are explained by the total quantity and 
relative prices of branded and generic versions of the pharmaceutical. Let us consider a 
situation in which there are n pharmaceuticals on the market. The bottom-level equation 
is defined as: 
7) sib = αib + βib ln(ri/pi) + γibb ln(pib) + γigb ln(pig)       
where pib and pig are the prices of the branded and generic versions of pharmaceutical i 
= 1,2,...,n, sib is the market share of the branded version of pharmaceutical i, that is sib = 
pibqib/ri, and ri = pibqib + pig qig is the total revenue of pharmaceutical i. The price of 
pharmaceutical i is computed as the (Stone-weighted) price pi = pibsibpigsig, where sib and 
sig are market shares of the branded and generic versions of pharmaceutical i. Unknown 
parameters αib, βib, γibb and γigb are estimated from the data. Following Ellison et al. 
(1997), we assume throughout that γigb = -γibb.  
One can also estimate a model for generic pharmaceutical i. In this case the left hand 
side variable in the bottom-level equation 7) is the market share of the generic 
pharmaceutical i. In order to separate these branded and generic equations from each 
other, we denote the parameters of the bottom equation of the generic pharmaceutical 
αig, βig, γibg and γigg. Because it always holds true that sib + sig = 1, it must also be the 
case that αib +αig = 1, βib = -βig , γibb = -γibg, and γigb = -γigg. 
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The top-level equation explains the quantity of pharmaceutical i by the total revenue 
and relative prices of all n pharmaceuticals (with different active agents, but substitutes) 
on the market. The top-level equation is defined as: 
 
8) ln(qi) = ηi + θi ln(R) + δi ln(pi/Pj),          
where the variable qi denotes the quantity of pharmaceutical i, R is the total sales of all 
pharmaceuticals on the market and i = 1,2,...,n. The variable Pj = ∏j≠i pjsj is the Stone-
weighted (Cobb-Douglas) price of pharmaceutical j. Prices pj for all j =1,2,...,n were 
defined above. The unknown parameters ηi, θi and δij are estimated from the data. 
Both the bottom-level and the top-level equation are estimated using the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) method. We add stochastic terms ui and vi to equations 1) 
and 2), respectively, and estimate both equations simultaneously for all pharmaceutical 
products i = 1,2,...,n. First, we assume that error terms ui (and vi) are correlated across n 
equations. If the data do not support this assumption, each equation is estimated 
separately using the OLS method.  
The model allows the derivation of conditional and unconditional demand elasticities. 
Conditional elasticities can be derived from the bottom-level equation by assuming that 
the total revenue of pharmaceutical i is fixed. In the derivation of unconditional 
elasticities, on the other hand, the revenue of pharmaceutical i is allowed to change 
when the prices of pharmaceuticals change.  
Conditional and unconditional elasticities can be derived from the bottom-level and top-
level equations. The conditional (revenue ri is kept fixed) own-price elasticity of the 
demand for branded pharmaceutical i is given as: 
9)  (∂qib/∂pib)(pib/qib) = (1/sib)(-βi sib + γib) – 1    
Other conditional elasticities (such as the conditional cross-price elasticity of the 
demand for branded pharmaceutical i with respect to the price of generic pharmaceutical 
i) can be similarly derived. Table 1 displays conditional elasticity equations.  
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Table 14. Conditional elasticity formulas  
 pib pig 
Dib (1/sib)(-βib sib + γibb) -1 (1/sib)(-βib sig + γigb) 
Dig (1/sig)(-βig sib + γibg) (1/sig)(-βig sig + γigg) -1 
 
In Table 14 it holds true that βib = -βig , γibb = -γibg , γigb = -γigg. 
Unconditional elasticities can be derived by allowing the revenue of pharmaceutical i to 
change when prices change. The unconditional own-price elasticity of the demand for 
branded pharmaceutical i is given as:  
10)  (∂qib/∂pib)(pib/qib) = (1/sib)(βi δii sib + γib) + sib(1+ δii) – 1  
Other formulas for unconditional elasticities can be similarly derived. Table 15, below, 
displays all necessary equations to be used to compute all own-price and cross-price 
elasticities. 
Table 15. Unconditional elasticity formulas 
 pib pig pjb pjg 
Dib (1/sib)[βib δi sib + 
γibb] + sib(1+ δi) – 1  
(1/sib)[βib δi sig + 
γigb] + sig(1+ δi)
  
(1/sib)[βib(-
δi)sjsjb] + (-δi)sjsjb 
(1/sib)[βib(-
δi)sjsjg] + (-δi)sjsjg
Dig (1/sig)[βig δi sib + 
γibg] + sib(1+ δi)
  
(1/sig)[βig δi sig + 
γigg ] + sig(1+ δi) – 1 
  
(1/sig)[βig(-
δi)sjsjb] + (-δi)sjsjb 
(1/sig)[βig(-
δi)sjsjg] + (-δi)sjsjg
In Table 15 it again holds true that βib = -βig , γibb = -γibg, γigb = -γigg. 
6.3 Data 
The data that were used to estimate the bottom-level and the top-level equations were 
provided by National Agency for Medicines in Finland. As explained earlier in Section 
4.1, the original data covered 8 ATC groups with 53,674 observations. To estimate 
elasticities we use data on statins, and from the ATC group C10 we include 
simvastatins, lovastatins and fluvastatins.  
Atorvastatins, pravastatins, rosuvastatins and serivastatins were excluded from the data 
set, either due to the lack of generic competition or the lack of observations. For 
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example, in the case of atorvastatins the generic competition took place in the 30th 
period. The inclusion of atorvastatins in the data set would have restricted the total 
number of observations to the last 14 periods for all groups. For pravastatins, the 
generic competitor entered in the 14th period, but market shares only started changing in 
period 31. Rosuvastatins entered in the 27th period and no generic substitute existed 
within the study period. Serivastatins lacked generic competition throughout the study 
period. Liquid drugs were excluded, because these are generally used in hospitals. 
Ellison et al. (1997) divided consumers into public buyers and hospitals, but it was not 
possible to divide our data into similar groups of consumers. Quarterly data cover the 
time period from 1997 to the end of 2007.  
The original data contained information about the quantities and sales revenue (in 
wholesale prices) of pharmaceutical products on the Finnish pharmaceutical market. 
Prices and quantities were entered for each drug and size of dose in the original data. 
Following Ellison et al. (1997), we created representative branded and generic 
pharmaceuticals in each group of statins. This was done by aggregating product-level 
observations across strength, packet size and dose. Using the market shares of 
individual pharmaceuticals as weights, we computed weighted prices for representative 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals.  
As a result, for 44 time periods we have for each active ingredient the market share, 
weighted price, sum of sales, weighted price of DDDs and logarithmic DDDs for 
branded and generic drugs. The variables are presented and defined in Table 16 below. 
Table 16. Variable definitions 
Bottom level variables 
ln(r/p) DDD quantity weighted by market share (revenue/ (log[weighted price ddd]) or Cobb-
Douglas price 
ln(pib) logarithmic (DDD) price for brand drug i 
ln(pig) logarithmic (DDD) price for generic drug i 
Top level variables 
ln(qi) Logarithmic sum of sold branded and generic DDDs of drug i 
ln(R) Logarithmic total sales in wholesale prices of branded and generic drug 
relprice Relative price of branded and generic drug for each ingredient 
Elasticity tables  
D(Drug)i Demand for Drug (sim, lov, flu), i=b(rand),g(eneric) type, with (column) 
P(Drug)i Price of Drug (sim, lov, flu), i=b(rand),g(eneric) type, with (row) 
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5.4 Results 
In the bottom level analysis we estimated the sub-group elasticities using the SUR 
(seemingly unrelated residuals) method. We concentrated on three groups of statins: 
simvastatins, lovastatins and fluvastatins. With these groups the SUR estimation could 
be performed with 41 observations for both generic and branded pharmaceuticals. For 
comparison, however, we also estimated the bottom-level equation using the data set 
including data on pravastatins. Below, Table 17 displays the market shares of the 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals in each group of statins. 
 
Table 17. Market shares of branded and generic drugs 
 
Marketshare Fluvastatin Lovastatin Pravastatin Simvastatin 
 branded 
 
43,84 % 
 
19,98 % 
 
36,35 % 
 
27,98 % 
generic 
 
56,16 % 
 
80,02 % 
 
63,65 % 
 
72,02 % 
 
The SUR estimates of the bottom-level equation are displayed in Table 18 below. The 
number of observations decline from 44 to 41, because the branded lovastatin exited the 
market after the 41st period. 
 
Table 18.  Bottom-level equation for the market shares of the branded pharmaceuticals, 
SUR-GLS  
Dependent variable: Market share for branded pharmaceutical, sb 
 Simvastatins Lovastatins Fluvastatins 
 coefficient  standard 
error 
coefficient  standard 
error 
coefficient standard 
error 
ln(r/p) -0.20513***  0.02713 0.26471* 0.14992 -0.02575 0.0187952 
ln(pb) -0.19661***  0.03546  -0.27516*** 0.06147 -0.64522*** 0.0533402 
ln(pg) 0.19661*** 0.03546  0.27516*** 0.06147 0.64522*** 0.0533402 
constant 2.56152*** 0.23313 -1.37513 1.10397 0.84556*** 0.1375588 
       
N 41  41  41  
Breush-
Pagan 
15.960*** 
*** = statistically significant at 0.01% significance level 
** = statistically significant at 0.05% significance level 
* = statistically significant at 0.10% significance level 
 
Most of the parameter estimates are statistically significant at reasonable significance 
levels. The estimate of the parameter βi for fluvastatins is not significant at the 5 per 
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cent significance level. Below we also display the SUR estimates using the extended 
data set, which includes pravastatins. By doing so, most of the parameter estimates are 
statistically significant at the one per cent significance level, but the number of 
observations is diminished to 11 quartiles. 
 
Table 19.  Bottom level SUR-estimates for Simvastatins, Lovastatins, Fluvastatins and 
Pravastatins 
 
Dependent variable: sb        
  Sim     Pra     Lov      Flu      
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
ln(r/p) -0,23115 0,009399 -0,28048* 0,120448 -0,85443 0,100213 -0,290272 0,028082
ln(pb) 0,126102 0,006036 -0,7382 0,065857 -0,56567 0,047643 0,206751 0,053832
ln(pg) -0,1261 0,006036 0,738195 0,065857 0,565667 0,047643 -0,206751 0,053832
constant 0,988023 0,03429 1,566075 0,2514 1,445806 0,118754 0,857737 0,052854
                  
N  11    11    11    11   
Breush-
Pagan 
20,353**  
    
* = statistically significant at 0.05% significance level 
(others statistically significant at 0.01% significance level) 
We then estimated the top-level equation 6). Our top-level equation differs from the 
original model developed by Ellison et al. (1997). We also estimated the original model, 
but high correlations between the price variables caused most of the parameter estimates 
to be statistically insignificant. We therefore ended up using the model 6), where instead 
of log-prices we use relative prices in the log form. The top level estimates are 
presented for simvastatins, lovastatins and fluvastatins. The number of pharmaceuticals 
used in the estimation also determines the number of unconditional elasticities that 
needs to be calculated. Results of estimation are listed in Table 20 below. 
 
Table 20. Top-level level SUR-estimates for Simvastatins, Lovastatins and Fluvastatins 
 
Dependent variable: ln(q) 
  Simvastatin   Lovastatin    Fluvastatin   
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
              
ln(R) 1, 317383*** 0,042761 0,193839*** 0,040733 0,965664*** 0,082021
relprice -1,264538*** 0,020586 -0,67712*** 0,103468 1,38917*** 0,07997 
constant 3, 68488*** 0,380569 12,58726*** 0,358203 5, 859844*** 0,716624
       
N 41  41  41  
Breush-Pagan 17,652***           
*** = statistically significant at 0.01 significance level 
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Conditional elasticities 
Table 21 displays the estimates of conditional elasticities. Diagonal elements in Table 
21 display the own-price elasticities of the branded and generic pharmaceuticals. To 
pick one example, the estimated own-price elasticity of the branded version of 
simvastatins is -1.116. Off-diagonal elements, on the other hand, are cross-price 
elasticities. For example, the estimated cross-price elasticity of the demand for branded 
simvastatin with respect to the price of generic simvastitin is 0.451. 
Table 21. Conditional elasticities, standard errors† in parenthesis 
 PSimb PSimg PLovb PLovg PFlub PFlug 
DSimb -1.116*** 
(0.08078944) 
0.451*** 
(0.04586175) 
    
DSimg 0.183 
(0.12771032) 
-1.712*** 
(0.07249733) 
    
DLovb   -1.909*** 
(0.05116654) 
0.289 
(0.3397511) 
  
DLovg   0.678*** 
(0.03817454) 
-1.216*** 
(0.25348104) 
  
DFlub     -2.069*** 
(0.10208379) 
1.112*** 
(0.08395544) 
DFlug     1.535*** 
(0.14660634) 
-2.597*** 
(0.12057154) 
† = standard errors are computed using the delta method 
*** = statistically significant at 0.01 significance level 
** = statistically significant at 0.05 significance level 
* = statistically significant at 0.1 significance level 
From Table 21 we notice that all calculated elasticities are reasonable, assuming that 
pharmaceuticals containing the same active substance are substitutes. Estimated 
elasticities are also statistically significant at the 1 per cent significance level. Branded 
simvastatins have the smallest own-price elasticity, while lovastatins and fluvastatins 
have higher elasticities. Fluvastatins have the highest cross-price elasticity. 
Unconditional elasticities  
When considering the unconditional elasticities, we allow the price change of one 
pharmaceutical to also affect the demand for pharmaceuticals containing other active 
pharmacological substances. The change in the price of the branded version of 
fluvastatins may affect the demand for the branded or generic simvastatins. This was not 
possible in the cases of conditional elasticities, where a price change is assumed to only 
influence the demand for pharmaceuticals containing the same pharmacological 
substance. 
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Table 22 displays own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for the branded and 
generic pharmaceuticals in each group. For the three groups of statins, there are 36 
elasticity estimates in total. 
 
Table 22. Own- and cross-price unconditional elasticises of demand  
 
 PSimb PSimg PLovb PLovg PFlub PFlug 
DSimb -1,224 0,383 0,062 0,082 0,100 0,070 
DSimg -0,065 -1,869 0,141 0,190 0,231 0,161 
DLovb 0,421 0,266 -1,685 0,589 0,131 0,091 
DLovg 0,140 0,088 0,752 -1,116 0,043 0,030 
DFlub -0,510 -0,322 -0,097 -0,130 -0,722 2,050 
DFlug -0,566 -0,358 -0,108 -0,145 3,032 -1,555 
The results in Table 22 suggest that own-price elasticities in the diagonal are 
reasonable, but some of the cross-price elasticities have unexpected signs. For example, 
the demand for generic simvastatin increases when the price of branded simvastatin 
increases. The own-price elasticity of the branded fluvastatin is negative, as expected. 
The cross-price elasticities for simvastatins with respect to the prices of lovastatins and 
fluvastatins are positive. This also applies to lovastins. Cross-price elasticities of 
fluvastatins, however, behave oddly. This could be because certain groups of statins 
were left out of the top-level analysis.  
6 Assessing the effect of the RP policy on 
pharmaceutical expenditures 
According to the literature review (see Appendix), in countries that have adopted the RP 
policy the prices of pharmaceuticals have decreased by from 10% to 29%. We use this 
finding, estimated unconditional elasticities in Table 22 and formula 6) to predict the 
expenditure effects of the reference pricing policy in the Finnish pharmaceutical market. 
The estimated reduction in pharmaceutical expenditures is based on the price-elasticity 
estimates of simvastatins, lovastatins and fluvastatins.  
Equation 6) can be used to estimate the change in pharmaceutical expenditures when 
elasticities and the relative change in prices are known. According to our data, the total 
sales of simvastatin, lovastatin and fluvastatins were €6.25 million. If the RP were to 
reduce the prices of pharmaceuticals by 100 per cent, the corresponding reduction in 
pharmaceutical expenditures (according to equation 6) is €3.4 million. Therefore, a 10% 
reduction in pharmaceutical prices would reduce the total pharmaceutical expenditures 
on simvastatins, lovastatins and fluvastatins by €337 000. This is approximately 5.38% 
of the total expenditures (€6.25 million).  
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In Table 23 we assume that the reference pricing policy reduces drug prices by 10, 20 or 
30 per cent and compute the corresponding reduction (in relative terms) in 
pharmaceutical expenditures. The obtained estimates are based on elasticities in Table 
22 and equation 6).  
 
Table 23. Estimated savings on pharmaceutical expenditures with reference price system 
The effect of the RP on 
prices of pharmaceuticals 
The relative reduction in pharma-
ceutical expenditures 
10 % 5,38% 
20% 10,77% 
30% 15,61% 
If we assume that all pharmaceuticals have similar elasticities and demand structures to 
simvastatins, lovastatins and fluvastatins, the above results in Table 23 can be 
generalized to all pharmaceuticals in Finland. We admit that such an assumption is too 
strong to be made. We therefore emphasize that there is a need for further research that 
could produce a more general picture of the demand structure in the pharmaceutical 
market in Finland.  
7 Final evaluation 
The impact of reference pricing in other countries: literature survey 
 
i) Effects on prices  
The empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction of price drops following the 
introduction of RP. In fact, initial price reductions have been reported in all countries 
where RP has been introduced, and price differences between brand name drugs and 
generics have generally been reduced. This effect is a short-term undisputed impact of 
the RP system. The long-term effects of RP on prices are more ambiguous, partly 
because the empirical literature on the topic does not really exist, the only exception 
being Danzon and Ketcham (2003). If the RP is not changed by government 
intervention, no firm will have the incentive to lower the RP. In the long term, the 
effects of the RP are therefore likely to be nill. For this reason, many governments have 
often intervened by arbitrarily reducing the RP.  
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ii) Effects on quantities and total expenditure  
According to the results reported in a systematic review for the Cochrane Collaboration 
by Aaserud, Dahlgren, Kosters, Oxman, Ramsay and Sturm (2008), the average effect 
on drug use six months after the transition period following the introduction of RP is a 
relative increase in the level of use of referenced drugs, estimated to be between 87% 
and 251%, and a relative decrease in the level of use of cost-share drugs estimated at 
between -35% and -41%. The authors also report that the average effect on drug 
expenditures six months after the transition period following the introduction of RP is a 
relative decrease estimated between -18% and -47%, and that the associated savings in 
drug expenditures are estimated to lie between a relative decrease of -3% and a relative 
increase of 48%.  
The estimated effects strongly depend on the type of RP under analysis. In generic 
referencing, where RP only applies to off-patent chemicals, the literature shows a slow 
but constant reallocation of the demand towards products still under patent protection. It 
is not clear, however, how much of this replacement is actually due to RP.  
In therapeutic referencing, on the other hand, it is logical to expect consistent savings in 
public/private expenditure, but no real effect on the overall number of prescriptions can 
be expected ex ante. The wide range of results also reflects the lack of clear-cut evidence.  
Although the lack of more formal approaches does not represent a problem when the 
outcome is price, quantities and expenditure are more difficult to evaluate. First of all, 
data do not generally show evident breaks in the overall market trends. Secondly, while 
variations are rare for prices, the variability in quantities is high and in most cases 
researchers can only rely on few covariates to explain the high levels of variance. 
Conclusions are thus less robust and self-evident than in the analysis of prices.  
 
iii) Other effects 
Besides prices and quantities, the two other main issues considered in the literature are the 
impact of RP on either the market shares of generics or on patient health. From the 
literature, generics seem to gain market shares following the introduction of RP. It seems 
safe to claim that the demand for off-patent products is very elastic (in most situations, 
brand-name prices high above the reimbursement level have been associated with evident 
drops in market shares). There is no evidence that RP affects patient health.  
If the clusters in RP are narrowly defined (e.g. generic referencing), the application of 
the RP policy should not affect the natural flow of pharmaceutical innovation. On the 
other hand, therapeutic referencing might create a strong disincentive for the launch of 
new products.  
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The impact of generic substitution on competition, prices and total 
expenditures: data analysis 
Generic substitution has increased competition in pharmaceutical markets. The markets 
here were defined as markets of pharmaceutical active agents, i.e., drugs with same 
active agents were assumed to compete with each other. Before the implementation of 
generic substitution, there were already more firms in the markets for those 
pharmaceuticals that later became substitutable in 2003 than in the markets for those 
that were left outside the substitution system. The number of firms in substitutable 
markets has increased by between 1 to 2 firms per active pharmaceutical agent, whereas 
the average number of firms was 2.5 at the beginning of 2003. There has been no 
change in the number of firms in markets outside the substitution system. 
The prices of pharmaceuticals that became substitutable in 2003 were higher before the 
implementation of the substitution reform than the prices of non-substitutable 
pharmaceuticals. Generic substitution dramatically lowered the prices of substitutable 
pharmaceuticals, by about 60 per cent at the end 2007. Analysis of the causes of this 
change faces some difficulties, because the variables measuring the change in 
competition and the direct (behavioural) effect of the generic substitution reform are 
correlated. When the direct effect of the reform and the competition effect of the reform 
on prices are estimated separately, it seems that most of the price reductions can be 
explained as a direct effect of the generic substitution reform. This direct effect consists 
of changes in the pricing behaviour of firms and the behaviour of doctors and 
consumers in prescribing and buying pharmaceuticals. A smaller part of the change is 
caused by increased competition. 
The price elasticities were estimated using pharmaceutical data on statins. Here it was 
assumed that statins all act as potential substitutes for each other. The price elasticities 
were estimated using orthodox demand analysis modelling. The estimated price 
elasticities generally behave in the expected way. The absolute values of the price 
elasticities are low, and thus we can expect that the total expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals decrease when the prices of pharmaceuticals decrease.     
 
A summary of the results: 
 According to the literature survey, the reference pricing systems have 
caused a reduction of 10 to 29 per cent in pharmaceutical prices in other countries. 
  According to the results of this empirical study, we estimate that the new 
reference pricing system in Finland will reduce the prices of pharmaceuticals by 
between 10 and 30 per cent, and the total expenditure on pharmaceuticals by between 5 
and 16 per cent. 
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Evaluation of the effects of reference pricing is difficult for two reasons: Before the 
implementation of the reference pricing system, generic substitution was introduced in 
Finland, and has already caused similar effects to those that would have oserved with 
the reference pricing system. Secondly, a large proportion of the changes caused by 
generic substitution seem to have resulted from changes in the behaviour of firms, 
doctors and consumers as a direct consequence of the reform, and not via increased 
competition. It is difficult to estimate ex ante these changes, because at the moment we 
know too little about the pricing strategies of the pharmaceutical companies, as well as 
doctors’ prescribing practices, to be able to competently estimate the magnitude of the 
changes caused by pharmaceutical regulation schemes. 
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1. Models and predictions by economic analysis 
 
Even though the existing literature on Reference Pricing (RP) has been mainly 
empirical, some authors have contributed to the analysis through the development of 
theoretical frameworks. 
 
The existing literature seems to point towards the conclusion that the effectiveness of 
RP in enhancing competition and controlling expenditure ultimately depends on a series 
of context specific factors such as demand elasticity, market structure, degree of 
differentiation of the pharmaceutical sector, timing of implementation and reference 
price rule. Despite being theoretical contributions many of these models draw on a 
series of assumptions, often country specific, and therefore results should not be 
generalized. 
 
The majority of the literature has focused on analysing the effects of reference pricing 
on firms pricing strategies and market shares by considering off patent drugs where 
branded and generic drugs compete. 
 
In the work by Mestre-Ferrandiz (2003), the author compares the impact of a reference 
price and a co-payment system in the pharmaceutical market with generic competition. 
Using a horizontal differentiated model where two firms compete á la Bertrand, the 
author concludes that, just for a specific reference price level, the reference price policy 
can control pharmaceutical expenditure by reducing drug prices. In more detail, the 
author analyzes the effects of introduction of RP in Spain and studies a market 
composed by two horizontally differentiated duopolists, where the patent of the active 
ingredients for the branded good has already expired and a generic alternative exists in 
the market. The author assumes that in the market there exists a continuum of 
consumers of the same type facing either a co-payment regime or a RP scheme. Under a 
co-payment regime, consumers pay a co-payment irrespective of what drug they buy, 
generic or branded while under the RP scheme consumers face a different situation. In 
fact, if they decide to buy the generic good, they still have to pay the co-payment, while 
if they decide to buy the branded drug, they have to pay a proportion of the RP plus the 
difference between the price of the branded good and that proportion. The author finds 
that RP can achieve the two envisaged objectives of reducing prices and public 
pharmaceutical expenditure only if RP is set in a certain interval, where both gross and 
net prices are lower for both products. The author also finds that, even though demand 
is higher for the branded product and lower for its generic alternative in this interval, 
total demand is higher under RP. The author finds, however, that profits for the generic 
producer can be unambiguously reduced if the RP is set anywhere in this interval and 
that the greater the value of the proportion of the RP to be paid by consumers, the more 
costly it would be to finance branded goods and the cheaper to finance generics. 
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Merino Castellò (2003) analyzes a vertical differentiation model with two firms 
operating in the market: one firm produces the brand-name drug whose patent has 
already expired, while the other produces the corresponding generic version of the 
branded drug. The author assumes a two-stages game where, in the first stage, firms 
choose the perceived quality of the good they want to produce and, in the second stage, 
a competitive process occurs where firms set prices. The author also assumes that, at 
each stage of the game, firms make their decisions about quality and prices either 
simultaneously or sequentially, so that four scenarios can be analysed. The quality game 
is solved by taking into account two different assumptions about the timing of the game: 
branded copies or “me-too” drugs enter the market simultaneously with the original 
product while generic drugs enter the market after the patent on the corresponding 
brand-name drug has already expired. The author solves the price-setting sub-game by 
assuming either Bertrand or Stackelberg competition. The author finds that, under the 
RP system, branded drug producers decrease prices substantially in order to adapt to the 
new competitive situation while generic prices remain more or less constant. The author 
also finds that in Bertrand models, market shares do not change after the introduction of 
RP, while in Stackelberg models, the market share of the branded drugs even increases 
and that of generic drugs decreases. Furthermore, results show that in both cases, the 
branded drug producers compensate for the decline of profits by selling greater 
quantities instead of charging higher prices. 
 
On a broader set-up, a couple of other papers analyse the impact of RP on market 
structure. 
 
Cabrales (2003) aims at explaining through a formal model the tendency of regulation 
to generate higher market shares for the higher-priced versions of a product. The author 
proposes a multi-stages duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which, first, 
the government announces a price ceiling, such as a RP scheme. The firms, then, set a 
level of “perceived” quality for the product and, finally, compete in prices, taking into 
account the price ceiling set by the government. The author finds that the lower the RP-
like price ceiling, the higher the market share of the higher-priced variety. The author 
also notices that such a result is independent of the parameter values of the model 
capturing the size and variety of tastes in the market and the size and convexity of the 
costs of producing perceived quality. The author suggests as intuition behind the result 
stated above the fact that market shares depend on the ratio of the price ceiling to the 
high quality, but the quality responds to the price ceiling less than proportionally, due to 
the convexity of the costs of quality. 
 
Miraldo (2007) within a horizontal differentiation model, where duopolists compete 
non-cooperatively on a quality-then-price game, analyses the relative effects of 
reference pricing and co-payment reimbursement on firms pricing and quality strategies 
as well as on market coverage under different market structures: competitive market, 
local monopolies and exogenous full market coverage. In the general set up with 
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consumers in the market that might opt out from not buying any of the drugs the author 
shows that by comparing co-payment with reference pricing neither reimbursement 
policy can be assumed to be always unambiguously superior in terms of pharmaceutical 
expenditure control, quality and market coverage under any market structure. Even if 
drugs prices are lower under one particular policy, this might arise at a high welfare cost 
if quality or market coverage vary negatively by the introduction of such a policy. 
Within the set-up where the market is exogenously fully covered, the author has shown 
that the reference pricing is nested in the co-payment system, and therefore RP is 
equivalent, in terms of prices and qualities, to a system where there is no 
reimbursement. The only role of reference pricing is acting as "reimbursement ceiling" 
for the third party payer. Therefore, the author concludes that, contrary to the co-
payment rate, reference price can not be used as a regulatory instrument for the 
determination of prices, qualities or for market coverage. 
 
Miraldo (2008) goes one step further with respect to these contributions by assuming 
that reference pricing is endogenously obtained as a function of firms pricing strategies 
and by assuming that firms are non-naive in the sense that they anticipate the impact of 
their strategies on reference price calculation. By considering weak substitutability 
between drugs within a horizontal and vertical differentiation framework the author 
studies the impact of different reference pricing formulations on firms pricing strategies, 
market coverage, public and private expenditure. In particular, the author considers two 
reference pricing rules: (i) reference price as the minimum of the observed prices in the 
market, (ii) reference price as a linear combination of firms’ prices. Results show that 
under the “minimum policy” firms are not able to coordinate on higher prices while the 
“linear policy”, implicitly, provides a coordination device. Also, relatively to the “linear 
policy”, when the reference price is the minimum of observed prices, after policy 
implementation, total and private expenditures are higher and consumer surplus and 
firms’ profits are lower. With quality differentiation both the minimum and linear 
policies unambiguously lead to higher prices. 
 
In the same line, another bulk of research considers the impact of reference price by 
explicitly modelling the criteria used to define the product clusters to which different 
reference price rules apply. 
 
Brekke, Konigbauer and Straume (2007) analyze the effects of RP systems for 
pharmaceuticals, focusing on a specific therapeutic market with potentially three firms. 
Two of the firms offer horizontally differentiated brand-name drugs. One of these drugs 
is off-patent and faces competition from a generic version offered by a third firm. The 
other drug is on-patent and will be introduced in the market if the profits are sufficient 
to cover the entry costs. Within this framework, the authors compare three scenarios: 
one with no RP (NRP), one with a generic RP (GRP) and one with a therapeutic RP 
(TRP). The authors find that TRP triggers competition most, resulting in lower 
equilibrium prices for every drug in the therapeutic market. The authors also find that 
GRP distorts drug choices most, resulting in a higher level of patient health risks, 
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measured in terms of aggregate mismatch costs, than the other two reimbursement 
systems. Thus the authors argue that TRP is preferable from the perspective of both the 
third party payer and the patients and notice that such beneficial role of TRP crucially 
relies on the assumption that the new on-patent drug enters the market. If the market 
entry costs are sufficiently high, TRP may in fact result in a worse outcome than both 
GRP and NRP. The authors also argue that TRP may induce pharmaceutical firms to 
invest more in drastic innovations, not subject to RP, rather than non-drastic 
innovations, which are likely to be included in a RP group. 
 
Brekke, Grasdal and Holmas (2008) present a formal model on the impact of regulatory 
regimes on pharmaceutical price setting. The authors consider a therapeutic market with 
an original brand-name drug facing competition from a generic version, and with 
consumers partially insured and facing a co-payment when buying a drug. The authors 
assume that the demand for a drug is decreasing in the co-payment for that drug, but 
increasing in the co-payment for the alternative drug. The authors also assume that the 
demand structure is such that the brand-name firm is able to charge a higher price than 
the generic firm without losing all demand, implicitly meaning that the two products 
cannot be perceived as perfect substitutes despite being therapeutically equivalent. The 
authors study two regulatory scenarios. Under a price-cap regulation, the regulator 
imposes a maximum price that the firms can charge for their products. The authors find 
that, under such a scenario, there is a positive relationship between the price-cap and the 
generic price, so that a stricter price-cap directly reduces the brand-name price and 
indirectly induces the generic firm to lower its price in order to maintain market shares. 
Under the RP scenario, on the other hand, the pharmaceutical firms are free to set their 
prices at any level, while the regulator imposes a RP which is the maximum 
reimbursement for a group of drugs with similar therapeutic properties. The authors 
notice that, since the RP is set somewhere between the brand-name and the generic 
price, an effect of the introduction of RP is that a patient demanding a high-priced 
brand-name drug have to cover the price difference. The authors find higher demand 
responsiveness to price changes for the brand-name drug and notice. The authors also 
find that, since RP imposes a higher brand-name co-payment, brand-name demand is 
also lower for given prices, so that RP introduces an incentive for the branded drugs’ 
firm to lower its price in order to maintain market shares. The authors argue that the 
incentives for the generic firm under RP are, however, weaker and more ambiguous. 
The authors notice that, since RP implies a higher brand-name co-payment, shifting 
consumers toward the generic firm, for the generic firm facing higher demand it may be 
optimal to increase its price. The authors observe, however, that, since the brand-name 
firm responds to RP by lowering its price, the net effect on equilibrium market prices is 
ambiguous. Moreover, the authors find that the ranking of price levels under price-cap 
regulation and RP is ambiguous. 
 
Only a limited number of research actually recognizes the primary role of physicians as 
prescribers by analysing the way RP shapes physicians incentives is in line with RP 
aims. 
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Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) using a duopoly set-up, have studied the effects of reference 
pricing on physicians' prescriptions and on pharmaceutical companies pricing strategies. 
In their model physicians chose between a branded breakthrough and a generic drug. 
Results show that RP has different effects depending on the type of physicians. Indeed, 
the authors show that keeping the price above the RP level may induce substitution at 
least among those physicians who do not give emphasis on whether a drug is 
breakthrough or not. Those physicians that are considerably concerned with the drug 
adverse reactions will keep on prescribing the original brand. On the other hand, those 
physicians that weigh more the effect of decreased consumption due to co-payment, will 
prescribe more of the generic drug. The authors conclude that, if the share of physicians 
of the first type is predominant, the optimal strategy will be to price above the RP, even 
though at a lower level than in absence of RP. Otherwise drug companies will chose 
prices equal to the RP level. Another important result of the present paper is that the 
authors analyze the pricing strategies prior to RP, when firms anticipate this policy. The 
higher the expected RP level the higher the currently optimal price.  
 
Danzon and Liu (1996) by using a kinked demand model, analyse the impact of 
reference price on pricing strategy. In their model, the physician is the decision maker 
and acts as an imperfect agent to the patients. The authors show that, by considering 
only effects on incentives of physicians and patients, RP implies a demand curve for the 
manufacturer that is kinked at the reference price level. Given that for prices above this 
level demand is very elastic while for prices below this level demand is inelastic the 
authors show that the optimal strategy for pharmaceutical firms is to set prices at the 
kink implying, therefore, a decrease in the branded drug prices but an increase in the 
generic prices.  
 
Finally on the impact on R&D evidence is limited to Bommier, Jullien and Bardey 
(2006) that study the effects of reference pricing on the innovation effort of 
pharmaceutical firms. The authors model a dynamic game with three agents: 
pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. In a first stage pharmaceutical 
firms invest in R&D and introduce new molecules or treatments. In a second stage, the 
regulatory agency and the producers negotiate on prices using a Nash bargaining 
solution concept. Finally, patients and doctors jointly determine the consumption of 
drugs. The RP formulation considered by these authors is very specific and consists of 
assuming that all the drugs in the therapeutic class are sold at the same price and that 
there are no drugs sold at prices above the official price. Results on the net effect of the 
uniform pricing rule within a therapeutic class are ambiguous. Indeed, the authors find 
that if on the one hand a decrease in price due to the production of me-too drugs reduces 
the incentives to create pioneer drugs, on the other, the introduction of me-too drugs is 
delayed, which gives positive incentives to launch pioneers.  
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2. Empirical evidence on economic effects of RP policies  
2.1. Methodology  
 
The reviewed papers are categorized according to three main characteristics. In this 
short section we explicit these three criteria.  
 
The first choice to be made for an empirical assessment of the impact of the RP policies 
is the outcome variable to be used for the evaluation. Traditionally, the RP literature 
concentrates on either prices or quantities, with a frequent extension to the effects in 
terms of total (public) expenditure. In the following, the existing studies are categorized 
according to the outcome used for the evaluation. To the mentioned prices and 
quantities, a further category is added: other effects, i.e. all the outcomes different from 
prices and quantities (expenditure). Specifically, most of the studies included in this 
group address two main issues: the effect of the RP on the market structure (e.g. number 
of generics) and the effects of the RP on patients’ health.  
 
The second critical point in every empirical assessment is the country analyzed. Once 
the analysis moves away from the abstractions of the theoretical models, the knowledge 
of the specific regulatory framework under analysis is fundamental for the interpretation 
of the results. Moreover, it should be pointed out that correct statistical analyses rely on 
the previous identification of all the policy interventions that might have affected treated 
and counterfactual groups (see below). A well-constructed empirical study must then 
also include country-specific policy-related covariates in order to capture the effects of 
policy interventions not directly linked with the RP regulation. In the following, the 
abovementioned categorization according to the outcomes is enriched by a further 
distinction by country. In addition, a short country specific description of the RP policy 
will be included. As a note of caution, however, it must be clear that the description of 
the regulatory framework is synthetic and referred only to the information needed to 
interpret the empirical results.  
 
The third important issue in evaluating the empirical literature on RP policies is the 
methodology used for the analysis. Many studies used only observational graphs on 
aggregated data, with no formal test. Others exploited the time-series dimension of their 
dataset, comparing the outcomes before and after the introduction of the RP. The most 
complete studies also identified a proper counterfactual, generally represented by a 
category of drugs to which the RP did not apply. Below the general classification of the 
empirical approaches used in the reviewed studies is described. Each study is then 
categorized accordingly.  
 
In the following, papers are hierarchically categorized according to the three criteria 
described above. The general idea is that each of the outcome-section (i.e. prices, 
quantities, other effects), is self containing, i.e. the reader does not need to refer back to 
previous parts. For this reason, at the beginning of each country between two and seven 
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lines of regulatory description are added. This part is repeated each time the country is 
considered in one of the three different outcome-sections. Each study is also categorized 
according to its empirical approach, and the category, repeated each time a study is 
quoted, is specified in parenthesis, next to the year of publication.  
 
2.1.1. Classification of the empirical approaches 
 
The reviewed studies are classified according to their methodological profile in four 
categories: 
 
DD: The study has a clearly defined time of intervention. The study entails a formal 
statistical analysis in which the treated group is observed before and after the 
intervention and compared with a control group, also observed for the same period of 
time.  
 
BA: The study has a clearly defined time of intervention. The study entails a formal 
statistical analysis in which the treated group is observed before and after the 
intervention but it is not compared with a control group. 
 
The typical analysis method for DD and BA studies is a more or less complicated linear 
regression analysis with time and group related dummies. DD represents the benchmark 
for any policy analysis. BA is a second-best choice, often dictated by data availability. 
In any case, these two approaches represent by far the most reliable source of empirical 
results on the impact of the RP.  
 
DES: The study entails basic statistical regression analyses, some descriptive statistics 
or some data-based case study. In these studies the empirical strategy is not related with 
the micro-econometric literature on policy impact evaluation, i.e. the analysis is not 
determined in terms of treatment/control or before/after. Examples of DES studies are 
hedonic price approaches, price levels as a function of number of firms, but also 
graphical inspection of novel series of data.  
 
REV: The study reports some empirical evidence from other sources or describes a case-
study without novel data. This group includes, among other studies, reviews of existing 
literature and commentaries on the state of the art of RP policies. 
 
If the effects are strong and clear from, for example, graphical inspection, the DES and 
the REV methodologies might represent a reliable source of information. It is very 
critical, however, that the description of the regulatory intervention is complete and that 
the confounding factors are somehow controlled for.  
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2.2. Overview of economic effects of RP policies  
 
 
2.2.1. Effect on prices 
 
General overview. The empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction of price 
drops following RP introduction. In fact, initial price reductions are reported in all 
countries where RP has been introduced and price differences between brand names 
drugs and generics is generally reduced. This effect is a short-run undisputed impact of 
the RP system. 
The long run effects of the RP on prices are more ambiguous, also because the empirical 
literature on the topic does not really exist (only exception, Danzon and Ketcham, 
2003). If the RP is not changed by government intervention, no firm will have the 
incentive to lower the RP. In the long run, thus, the effects of the RP are likely to be 
null. For this reason many governments have often intervened by arbitrarily reducing 
the RP.  
In terms of statistical methodology and quality of data, the number of DD and BA 
studies is high compared to the studies focusing on other outcome measures. The most 
rigorous studies concentrate on Germany (Pavnick, 2002), Canada (Schneeweiss and 
colleagues, 2002-2003; Grootendorst and colleagues, 2005-2006) and Spain (Puig-
Junoy 2007). The descriptive evidence, however, is not ambiguous and provides a 
sufficient amount of results that are mostly consistent with each other.  
 
Germany 
In Germany the RP was introduced in 1989. Germany applied RP sequentially to 
different categories of products. Class 1 includes products with the same active 
ingredient (generic equivalents), Class 2 applies to therapeutically and 
pharmacologically similar active ingredients, and Class 3 applies to compounds with 
comparable therapeutic effect, especially combinations. Class 3 RP is rarely applied. 
The level of the RP is found as a weighted average (cobb-douglas) of existing prices. 
Pharmacists can not substitute (until 2001).  
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; REV) observe that the series of aggregated 
pharmaceutical data for the period 1988-1992 show that prices of drugs subject to RP 
decreased, with the exception of those with initial prices below the RP, which increased, 
and that prices of drugs not subject to RP increased at higher rates.  
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Maassen (1996; REV) finds that, after the introduction of RP, most producers of brand-
name drugs, with very few exceptions, decreased their prices at the level of the RP, 
while prices of generics on average did not change, even if in some case increased at the 
level of RP.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe that prices of products 
subjected to RP decreased by 1.5% in 1991-92 whereas the prices of those not under the 
RP scheme increased by 4.1%.  
 
Danzon (2001; REV) concludes that evidence from Germany clearly shows that RP has 
reduced the average price per molecule for drugs under RP, primarily because originator 
brand prices are reduced to the RP in order to minimize the loss of market share. 
 
Danzon and Liu (1996; DES) observe that pharmaceutical firms respond to the 
introduction of RP with different pricing strategies according to the demand elasticity 
for their products. The authors also argue that pharmaceutical firms’ best response is to 
set price at the RP, which generally means a price cut for originator products, where 
generics that were prices below the RP may raise their prices to the RP. The author’s test 
the above kinked demand model using data on 1989-94 prices and observe that virtually 
all brand manufacturers dropped their prices to the RP to reduce loss of market share. In 
the first year, prices were cut approximately by 13% and an additional 2-10% thereafter. 
Conversely, some lower-priced products either maintained or even raised their prices.  
 
VFA (2000; DES) reports that, between 1992 and 1999, prices of drugs under RP fell by 
14%, while prices of products outside RP system and the cost of living increased by 6% 
and 13%, respectively.  
 
Danzon (2001; DES) observes that in the period January-August 1998 the decrease of -
2.1% in the average prices for drugs subject to RP and the opposite increase of 2.5% in 
the average price of products not covered by RP translated in an aggregate decline in the 
total average price of drugs of about -0.2%.  
 
Giuliani, Selke and Garattini (1998; DES) study data from official statistics on 
consumption and average prices per Defined Daily Dose (DDD) (which is the 
therapeutical daily dose of active ingredient usually taken by a patient for a given 
pathology) in period 1989-96 for drugs within 8 therapeutic groups: beta-blockers, 
calcium antagonists, non-opiate analgesics, oral hypoglicemics, NSAIDs, expectorants, 
coronary dilators and systemic antibiotics. The authors observe that in most cases, each 
group’s average price per DDD declined, predictably, after the introduction of RP and 
that most brand prices dropped to the RP. In particular, initial levels of average prices 
per DDD decreased within all the therapeutic groups expect systemic antibiotics and 
oral hypoglicemics, for which the authors observe a shift towards drug products with 
more costly active ingredients, not covered by RP. 
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Pavnick (2002; DD), performs a series of semilogarithmic regressions with the purpose 
of identifying the effect of the RP policy on prices. She includes two groups of drugs: 
anti-diabetics and antiulcerants. Data are quarterly observations of prices per Defined 
Daily Dosage (DDD) for the period January 1986-December 1996. Depending on the 
therapeutic group and on the estimation specifications, she finds that prices reductions 
due to the RP policies range between 10% and 26%. Moreover, generic competition 
seems to play an important role, with prices drops being positively correlated to the 
number of generics in the market.  
 
Danzon and Ketcham (2003; DES) estimate a hedonic price equation for Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand. The data used are cross-sectional, so that the only 
possible estimation strategy is to rely on between groups variation. Authors want to 
estimate the impact of different covariates on the price per DDD. Among other findings, 
they show that the number of generics affects negatively the average price, but this 
reduction is very limited for Germany: prices drop of 1% for each generic entry. 
Moreover, they find no evidence that the RP is lower for more competitive markets. 
Authors point out that RP policies, despite being set with the purpose to increase 
competition, are not actually sensitive to the competitive pressure from generics 
(because generics have no real incentives to lower their prices below the RP).  
 
 
The Netherlands  
A RP was introduced in 1991. The Dutch RP system included almost all on-patent and 
off-patent drugs. Classification decisions were made by the Ministry of Health, with 
input from a panel of medical advisors. The RP level is set as a median of existing 
prices. In 1996 maximum wholesale price policy was introduced. 
 
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; DES) find no significant impact of the introduction 
of RP on pharmaceutical prices.  
 
Bloor, Maynard and Freemantle (1996; DES) and Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy 
(2001; REV) observe that the initial effect of the first phase of RP introduction was 
lower prices, by 5% between 1991 and 1993, for drugs under RP, while for those drugs 
that were not included prices increased by more than 20% per annum since 1988.  
 
However, de Vos (1996; REV) and Dickson and Redwood (1998; REV) point out that 
prices of drugs covered by RP decreased much less than predicted. It was exactly 
because of the still high prices in the Netherlands, compared with other Western 
European countries, that the government decided to implement the Maximum Price 
Regulation Law on Drugs in 1996.  
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Danzon (2001; REV) observes that the 1996 Maximum Price Law resulted in price 
reductions averaging 15%, although with considerable variations across compounds. 
Moreover, while in January 1996, the average price differences between brand and 
generic, and between brand and parallel import drugs were 19% and 14.7%, 
respectively, in 1997 these differences fell to 9.6% and 7.1% due to the Maximum Price 
Law. The author argues that these small price differences further confirm the lack of 
aggressive generic price competition in list prices. Moreover, she observes that, whereas 
the RP system alone led to convergence of list prices at the RP - including price 
increases for products previously below the RP, according to the kinked demand model 
by Danzon and Liu (1996) -, the Maximum Price Law forced a greater spread in the 
prices of different compounds within a cluster. Prices for different products in each 
compound were bunched at that compound’s maximum price and all capped by the RP. 
Since in 1998, RP were reduced, based on these lower, price-capped prices, in 1999 
most firms dropped their prices. The author also observes that the Maximum Price Law 
and the increased interdependence of markets may change firm’s response to the RP 
scheme with respect to the kinked demand model. In fact, if the Dutch RP is below the 
pharmaceutical firm’s Europe-wide target price, the firm may set its price above RP and 
may attempt to rebate the difference directly to the patient. The author concludes that 
RP has reduced prices on branded products, particularly new products, while the 
Maximum Price Law has presumably further reduced prices of innovative drugs relative 
to generics.  
 
Danzon and Ketcham (2003; DES) estimate a hedonic price equation for Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand. The data used are cross-sectional, so that the only 
possible estimation strategy is to rely on between groups variation. Authors want to 
estimate the impact of different covariates on the price per DDD. For the Netherlands, 
they show that the number one generic firm entering the market induces a small (1.6%) 
reduction in prices. As with Germany, they interpret this finding as evidence of the low 
long-run effect of the RP policies in absence of further price-cut interventions from the 
government.  
 
 
New Zealand  
Reference pricing was introduced in July 1993. All reimbursed products are assigned to 
therapeutic subgroups with similar health effects. Patent status is not considered. New 
Zealand sets the RP at the lowest price in each subgroup, regardless of patent status. 
Generic substitution rules permit the pharmacist to substitute generics unless the 
physician explicitly prescribes the brand. 
 
 
Klethco, Moore and Jones (1995; REV) and Pharmac (1996; REV), the pharmaceutical 
public agency which operates the national scheme, consider RP to have been a highly 
effective and powerful tool, because pharmaceutical firms have tended to lower their 
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prices to the subsidy level, rather than risking their market shares, and, where prices 
were not lowered, patients tended to switch to fully subsidized alternatives rather than 
pay a premium.  
 
Woodfield, Fountain and Borren (1997; REV) observe that, in February 1996, Pharmac 
introduced the RP scheme in the angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors. The 
lowest-priced ACE inhibitor based on Pharmac’s weighted average daily cost (WADC) 
methodology was the market leader, enalapril, which thus determined the subsidy 
offered to all ACE inhibitors. The prices of ACE inhibitors generally fell to match 
enalapril’s WADC. This seemed consistent with Pharmac’s argument that RP stimulates 
competition among drugs with the same or similar therapeutic effect. But it is also 
consistent with the author’s argument that the competition stimulated by RP may be 
limited in that there may be no incentive for a company to cut the price of a fully 
subsidized medicine, particularly when all medicines are fully subsidized. The authors 
also observe that, in the case of ACE inhibitors, while nearly comprehensive price 
matching followed the introduction of RP in enalapril, widespread price reductions did 
not follow the massive reduction by 60% in the price of quinapril. It seems clear that 
most suppliers were willing to accept a reduction in market share rather than further 
reducing prices, contrary to the predictions of RP. In the case of leading brands, these 
market share reductions were very significant, and might have generated lower profits 
in the New Zealand market compared to price reductions or matching.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe that there is evidence of a 
downward trend in the real price of subsidized pharmaceuticals prior to the introduction 
of RP, raising questions such as whether RP was responsible for reducing the price of 
subsidized drugs more than would have occurred in its absence (there are no DD studies 
on this country). The authors also observe small average differentials in prices between 
generics and pioneer brands and argue that RP is not effectively keeping generic price 
levels low. The authors also report that firms might have set prices above the subsidy 
level: the price of Roche’s anti-inflammatory Naprosyn, for instance, rose 20% between 
1995 and 1996. 
 
Woodfield (2001; REV) points out that in until July 1997, the statins were not subject to 
RP and were fully subsidized. They were also subject to stringent quantity rationing 
under Pharmac’s special authority scheme. Simvastatin had dominated this market, 
while fluvastatin had almost no penetration. Simvastatin, however, was much costlier to 
subsidize. In August 1997 a new therapeutic group emerged in the Pharmac RP scheme, 
comprising fluvastatin, pravastatin and simvastatin. The outcome of RP produced very 
significant changes. While fluvastatin continued to be fully subsidized at the previous 
rate, the subsidies for the other two drugs fell dramatically, for instance by 75% for 
simvastatin 20mg. As a result, the supplier’s price for simvastatin was 75% (20mg) or 
even 129% (10mg) above its respective subsidy level. However, since, according to the 
authors, some evidence existed that the three statins did not have the same ability to 
reduce cholesterol to levels recommended for patients with high cholesterol, 
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prescriptions did not switched away from simvastatin, so that its market share did not 
radically fall. 
 
Danzon and Ketcham (2003; DES) estimate a hedonic price equation for Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand. The data used are cross-sectional, so that the only 
possible estimation strategy is to rely on between groups variation. Authors want to 
estimate the impact of different covariates on the price per DDD. For New Zealand, 
results show that one generic firm entering the market induces a significant (15%) 
reduction in prices. They justify this finding, which is not in line with the results for 
Germany and the Netherlands, as a consequence of the “requirement that new generic 
entrants offer a reduction in price and RP as a condition of reimbursement.” 
 
 
Sweden 
The RP was introduced in 1993 and dropped in 2002. It was a generic referencing, i.e. it 
applied only to products with expired patents and generic equivalents (same form, same 
active substance and same quality).  
 
Jonsson (1994; REV) and Drummond, Jonsson and Rutten (1997; REV) observe that 
the introduction of the RP scheme resulted in pharmaceutical manufacturers cutting the 
price of those drugs that were prices above the RP in anticipation of the fact that 
consumers would not have paid higher prices. Therefore, the prices of brand name 
products fell close to that of the generics.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) show that for original prices within the 
RP scheme, the price, with very few exceptions, dropped to the reimbursement price 
and that generic prices were reduced to the price of the lowest generic. However, the 
authors also observe that there was no incentive to set a price lower than that 
reimbursed and that, therefore, since their prices increased, some products were actually 
delisted. 
 
Bergman and Rudholm (2003; BA) analyse data from the Swedish Medical Product 
Agency (SMPA) from 1972 to 1996 for 18 pharmaceutical substances. The authors use 
an unbalanced data panel consisting of 1184 observations, on prices and quantities sold, 
each quarter, for the package size with the largest recorded sales volume for each 
substance. The authors estimate several panel regressions of the price of the brand-name 
product on product-specific dummies and a set of explanatory variables. The authors 
find that the Swedish RP system was only effective for products which already faced 
generic competition at the introduction of the system. The authors estimate that, in those 
cases, prices fell about 16-21% when the system was introduced. The authors argue that, 
while the introduction of RP lowered the prices of those incumbent products with faced 
actual generic competition, the RP system had no effect for products facing only 
potential generic competition.  
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Denmark 
The RP was introduced in 1993. Products are grouped on the basis of type of pack. All 
products, which have at least one copy version, including generics and parallel imports, 
are included. The RP is the average of the two cheapest drugs in the market. 
Pharmacists have the right of substitution.  
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; REV) observe that it is very difficult to discern any 
single pattern in pricing, even though individual firms seemed clearly they were 
optimizing their own position, given the specific market conditions surrounding their 
own products.  
 
Clausen (1995; REV), on the other hand, observes that there is no doubt that the 
introduction of RP has generally resulted in lower drug prices. 
 
 
Australia 
RP was introduced in 1998. It is a therapeutic RP which applies to six therapeutic 
categories: H2 receptor antagonists (ulcer), statins, calcium channel blockers, ACE 
inhibitors, beta blockers (CVD). Pharmacist has the right to generic substitution. RP is 
the lowest price in the market.  
 
Ioannides-Demos, Ibrahim and McNeil (2002; REV) observe that, after the introduction 
of RP scheme, for some drug groups, such as the statin group of cholesterol-lowering 
drugs, all manufacturers reduced prices to a level satisfactory to the government. The 
patient contribution remained the same as that prior to the introduction of the scheme 
for medicines at the RP. Patients who chose to stay with a higher priced drug paid an 
additional average premium of about A$2 (Australian dollars). Only four drugs had a 
premium greater than A$3: ramipril 2.5 mg and 5 mg, amlodipine 10 mg and cimetidine 
effervescent tablets. At the time of introduction of the scheme, the costs for 50% of the 
drugs remained the same. The authors observe that the data from the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Analysis Section suggest that price reduction occurred with many therapeutic 
groups. The average dispensed price of ACE inhibitors on the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme was A$31.19 in the 1998 calendar year, compared with A$33.18 in 1997. 
Similarly, the average dispensed price of calcium channel blocks was A$25.50 in 1998 
and A$26.39 in 1997. The category that did not attract a Therapeutic Group Premium, 
namely the statins, was the drug group with the highest increased cost to the 
government in 1999-2000.  
 
 
Canada (British Columbia) 
RP was introduced in 1995. Under Type 1 RP, only chemically equivalent drugs are 
considered interchangeable, either branded or generic versions of the same drug. 
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Under Type 2 RP, all drugs from the same therapeutic class are considered 
interchangeable. This therapeutic RP applied to some specific clusters: H2 Antagonists, 
NSAIDs, ACE inhibitors, calcium channel blockers. Usually the reference for 
reimbursement is the least expensive product. Generic substitution is allowed.  
 
 
Schneeweiss, Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn (2002; BA) analyze 
monthly data of claims from British Columbia for 24 months before and 12 months 
after implementation of RP and identify 119074 patients, 65 years of age or older, for 
whom at least one ACE inhibitor was dispensed between January1995 and June 1998. 
For each of the 8 ACE inhibitors, the authors determine the median monthly dose 
(MMD, in mg) dispensed during the 8-month period from November 1995 to June 
1996, for patients who filled at least one prescription during a period of 120 days 
before, and a period of 120 days after the 8-month period. The authors plotted trends 
over time with 95% confidence intervals and use generalized linear models for repeated 
measures to estimate sudden changes in trends or levels of ACE inhibitor use after the 
introduction of RP. The authors’ regression models include a constant term, a term for 
linear time trend before RP and assume autocorrelated covariance structures. The 
authors find that the RP policy did not appear to produce a systematic change in drug 
prices per MMD across substances: the mean change was -C$0.15 per MMD, with a 
standard deviation of C$0.19. 
 
Marshall, Grootendorst, O’Brien, Dolovich, Holbrook and Levy (2002; DD) consider 
aggregate monthly claims data, from January 1993 to May 1999, for hystamine-2 
receptor antagonists (H2RAs), proton pump inhibitors (PPIs), sucralfate, prokinetic 
agents and misoprostol, from Pharmacare, the publicly funded drug subsidy program for 
seniors and various other residents of British Columbia. The data included the numbers 
of prescriptions and unit doses dispensed, the costs reimbursed by Pharmacare and the 
payments made by the beneficiaries. The authors analyzed claims data only for patients 
65 years of age or older. For both H2RAs and PPIs, expenditure trends observed in the 
first 3 periods were estimated with regression models and then projected forward to 
predict the expenditures that would likely have accrued in the absence of policies. For 
all periods analyzed, the mean reimbursement by Pharmacare per defined daily dose 
(DDD) of restricted H2RAs fell from C$0.98 to C$0.76 between the baseline period and 
the 12-month period after the RP policy went into effect, but remained above the RP 
because some restricted H2RAs were still reimbursed at full cost for beneficiaries who 
had been granted exemption from the policy. In the same time interval, reimbursement 
by Pharmacare per DDD of all H2RAs fell by more than half, from C$0.85 to C$0.40, 
which reflected both the shift to greater use of generic cimetidine and the declining 
reimbursement per DDD of restricted H2RAs. In contrast, reimbursement by 
Pharmacare per DDD of PPIs and other gastrointestinal drugs, such as cisapride, did not 
change appreciably. 
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Schneeweiss, Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn (2003; BA) select a 
cohort of 35886 patients, 65 years of age or older, who received a dihydropyridine 
calcium channel blockers (DCCBs) between December 1995 and March 1996. The 
authors define median monthly doses (MMDs) for each of 4 DCCBs as the median of 
all doses dispensed per month in mg averaged over a 8-month period starting on 
November 1995. The authors plot time trends as MMD dispensed per 10000 patients 
with 95% confidence intervals, and use generalized linear models for repeated measures 
to estimate sudden changes in trends or levels of DCCB use after the introduction of RP. 
To compare utilization trends, the authors use a longitudinal repeated-measures design 
with individual-level data over 42 monthly observations. The authors find that the RP 
policy did not appear to produce a systematic change in drug prices per MMD across 
substances: the mean change was -C$0.80 per MMD, with a standard deviation of 
C$0.60. 
 
Grootendorts, Marshall, Holbrook, Dolovich, O’Brien and Levy (2005; BA) consider 
monthly data over the period February 1993 to June 2001 from retrospective 
population-based claims, to examine patterns of drugs’ prices under the application of 
RP by Pharmacare, the publicly funded drug subsidy program for seniors and various 
other residents of British Columbia. The authors consider the application of RP to the 
nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs (NSAIDs). The authors observe that Type 2 RP 
appeared to have a substantial effect on reimbursement prices: Pharmacare expenditure 
per day of dispensed NSAIDs dropped by almost half, from C$0.80 to C$0.44. By 
contrast, Type 1 RP had a much smaller effect on prices. The authors also find that prior 
to the introduction of RP, the unrestricted NSAIDs cost Pharmacare C$0.23 per day, 
whereas the other NSAIDs cost up to six times as much. Whereas, after the introduction 
of Type 1 RP such a difference reduced only marginally, after the introduction of Type 2 
RP and the delisting of various NSAIDs in November 1996, the restricted NSAIDs cost 
about four times more than the unrestricted ones. The authors also find that there is no 
evidence that RP increased retail prices of either the unrestricted or restricted drugs.  
 
Grootendorst and Stewart (2006; DD) critically assess the identifying assumption 
inherent in the “before and after” (BA) design, namely that pre-RP trends accurately 
predict counterfactual outcomes. The authors estimate the impact of RP on expenditure 
on ACE inhibitors and calcium channel blockers (CCBs) by Pharmacare, the publicly 
funded plan for seniors and various other residents of British Columbia. The authors 
also use similar data from a public plan in Ontario (Ontario Drug Benefit plan) that had 
not introduced RP, to estimate the effects on drug expenditures of patent expiration, 
secular changes in prescribing patterns and various other factors common to all 
Canadian public drug plans that could potentially confound the BA estimates of the 
effect of RP on drug plan expenditures. Using monthly data from January 1994 to 
December 2000, they find that average monthly reduction on the reimbursement price in 
the post-RP period was C$0.07 for ACE inhibitors and C$0.08 for CCB, about half the 
BA estimates by previous studies (see for instance the study above by Schneeweiss, 
Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn, 2003). The authors suggest that pre-
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RP expenditure trends for CCB are likely biased counterfactual estimates and that part 
of the reduction in the daily cost of dispensed therapy is likely due to factors other than 
RP.  
 
Spain 
A RP system was effectively introduced in Spain in December 2000. This system is 
applied to off-patent drugs with the same active ingredient. Initially, the RP was 
calculated on the basis of the weighted average (year on year) of the lowest-priced 
products that account for at least 20% of the market sales.  
 
Puig-Junoy (2007; DD) aims at evaluating the intended and unintended impact on 
pharmaceutical use and volume of sales of the Spanish generic RP system for statins. 
The author develops a DD analysis of 46 monthly drug use and volume of sales ratios, 
from January 2001 to October 2004, valued at regulated ex-factory prices. Data are 
from IMS, a marketing research company, and from the centralized National Health 
System pharmaceutical consumption database of the Spanish Ministry of Health. The 
author observes that brand-name lovastatin and simvastatin and their generic substitutes, 
with a price higher than the RP, immediately reduced their price to the RP, after its 
introduction. The introduction of RP system tends to decrease the price of the original 
drug relative to the price of generics. Moreover, the author observes that the price of 
new generic entrants for lovastatin and simvastatin in the period after RP introduction 
was in all cases lower than the lowest preceding price, usually corresponding to the 
lowest-priced generic in each period of time. Furthermore, the author finds that the price 
of all products already on the market before the introduction of RP with a price equal to, 
or lower than, the RP remained absolutely constant during the period after, and did not 
experience any consumer price competition effect because of RP, or because of the 
lower price of new generic entrants. Finally, the author notices that RP was not effective 
in reducing the consumer price of products with a price initially below the RP and that 
the number of generics firms in the market does not affect the prices of brands or 
generics in the market when their previous price was not above the RP level. The author 
concludes that price decline for brand-name and generic products was not clearly 
explained by variation in their exposure to competition, and only depended on arbitrary 
regulatory decisions as to the period for which the product was covered by the RP 
system and the moment at which the RP was revised. 
 
Ubeda, Cardo, Selles, Broseta, Trillo and Fernandez-LLimos (2007; BA) describe the 
evolution of antidepressant use in primary care in the Valencian region from 2000 to 
2004 and analyze the effects of the introduction of RP and generic drugs on drug 
utilization and cost saving. The authors analyze the prescription pattern of 
antidepressants using sales collected for the period 2000-04, converted into DDD per 
1000 inhabitants according to the methodology by the WHO Centre for Drugs Statistics. 
The authors observe that the implementation of RP forced the prices of the original 
brand to lower. For instance, the price of the original fluoxetine (Prozac capsules) that, 
 
 
 
 
79
prior to RP, was about €1.07, in 2004 decreased to a similar cost/DDD of generic 
capsules, about €0.4: the reduction of cost was not evident until the beginning of 2001 
(€0.89), and was specially marked in 2004, when it reached €0.58. The authors notice 
that, generally, most consumed branded antidepressants (paroxetine, fluoxetine, 
citalopram) suffered similar price reductions due to the generic competition, together 
with an implementation of RP, although this was not the case for other pharmaceutical 
forms: for instance, the fluoxetine orally disintegrating tablets maintained a cost/DDD 
rate of €0.83.  
 
 
Italy 
In Italy the RP was introduced in December 2001. It applies to off-patent drugs only 
(same dosage, same pack). The RP is the minimum price in the market. Pharmacists are 
allowed to substitute.  
 
Ghislandi, Krulichova and Garattini (2005; DES) show data on prices and volumes from 
January 2001 to April 2003 for the commonest packs of the top three active substances 
in terms of revenue, with at least one generic version: tipoclidine, nimesulide and 
ranitidine. The authors observe that in all three products prices clearly tended to fall, 
and that, in particular, there were steep drops for nimesulide and ticlopidine at the end 
of 2001, when the reimbursement limit was redefined, while ranitidine prices started 
falling at the beginning of 2002, after the launch of the first generic.  
 
Belgium 
The RP was first introduced in 2001. It is a generic referencing, i.e. the RP applies to 
drugs with the same active compound. The RP is initially set 16% lower than the 
branded product’s price. Over time, the Belgian government has progressively reduced 
the level of the RP. Generic substitution is allowed.  
 
Simoens, De Bruyn, Bogaert and Laekeman (2005; DES) analyze data on general trends 
and on evolution of particular drug classes. The former data are from IMS Health 
Belgium and relate to drug consumption of a representative panel of 2550 community 
pharmacies, about 50% of all Belgian pharmacies. The latter data are from Ifstat 
database, which brings together data on reimbursable drugs transmitted by community 
pharmacies to the third-party payer for the purpose of reimbursement. The authors 
observe that manufacturers of original drugs have reacted to the introduction of RP 
scheme in several ways. The authors notice that, as the RP scheme financially penalised 
patients from purchasing the more expensive original drugs, some pharmaceutical 
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companies reduced prices of original drugs in return for the abolition of prescribing 
conditions. In particular, the authors observe that, in these cases, the agreement to 
reduce the price of the original drug was accompanied by a switch of the drug from 
“Chapter IV” regulation, meaning that prescription required a priori approval by a 
physician from a health insurance find, to “Chapter I” regulation, implying 
unconditional prescription. The authors notice, for example, that this was applied to 
Zocor, the leading brand-name simvastatin.  
 
Hungary 
The first version of the RP was introduced in 1999. It was a generic referencing (i.e. RP 
applies to drugs with the same chemical). In 2003, a therapeutic referencing (i.e. RP 
applies to a cluster of chemicals) was introduced for some groups (including statins). 
The RP is the cheapest drug with a cumulative market share of 50%.  
 
Kalò, Muzbek, Bodrogi and Bidlò (2007; DES) analyze the Hungarian experience in 
introducing a therapeutic RP for statins in September 2003. The authors use as baseline 
period August 2003, the last month before the introduction of RP, and compare the 
average ex-factory and public prices, reimbursement level, patients’ co-payment and 
DDDs of prescribed units of statins with the ones in March 2004, using an IMS Health 
database built on sales reports of pharmaceutical wholesalers. In order to separate the 
impact of therapeutic RP from the generic RP and the decreased patient co-payment, the 
authors employ a time series analysis with the assumption that simvastatin price erosion 
was the sole consequence of generic RP, and estimated the impact of generic price 
erosion by deducting the potential expenditure on simvastatins, that is numbers of 
simvastatin prescriptions multiplied by their original prices, from the actual expenditure 
over the investigated period. The authors calculate the impact of therapeutic RP based 
upon dividing total ex-factory market growth by the impact of unit growth and generic 
price erosion, while calculate the budget impact of increased reimbursement, generic 
price erosion and therapeutic RP by comparing the relatively homogenous period of 
September 2003-March 2004, with February 2003-August 2003. The authors find that 
the main expected benefit of RP was the incentive for manufacturers to reduce the 
prices of original products. The authors find, however, that the price of patented original 
products (atorvastatin and fluvastatin) remained constant, and did not change even 
beyond the investigated period either, except temporarily during the government-
decreed 15% price cut period between April and June 2004. The authors also notice that 
as a result of price per DDD reimbursement, higher doses of the same substance became 
cheaper for the patients after the introduction of RP. Despite significant generic price 
erosion of simvastatin, the average unit price of statins was reduced by only 3.1% over 
7 months after the introduction of RP. 
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Norway  
A version of the RP was introduced in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent drugs already 
facing generic competition in six chemical substances targeted for depression, anti-
ulcer, allergy, high blood pressure and nigh cholesterol. It was a generic a therapeutic 
referencing (i.e. RP applies to a cluster of chemicals). The RP is an index price 
calculated as the sales-weighted sum of producer prices included in each sub-group. 
The government decided to terminate the system at the end of 2004. 
 
Brekke, Grasdal and Holmas (2008; DD) use a dataset from Farmastat providing 
information, over the four-year period from 2001 through 2004, on sales value (in 
pharmacy purchase price); volume (in DDD) for each package of drugs sold on the 
Norwegian pharmaceutical market; name, manufacturer, package size, dosage and 
launch date of each drug; and on whether the product was a brand-name or a generic 
drug. The authors look at the data on average prices for brand-names and generics for 3 
groups of pharmaceuticals: the drugs subject to RP; the drugs which are therapeutic 
substitutes under the alternative price-cap regulation; and the drugs which are 
independent in consumption and exposed to price-cap regulation. The authors observe 
that average prices of the drugs subject to RP displayed a pronounced decrease after the 
implementation of RP: average price of drugs subject to RP in the pre-regulation period 
was about NOK 4.7, while average pricing during RP was about NOK 3.3, implying a 
price reduction of more than 29%. The authors also conduct an econometric 
investigation to compare inter-temporal variation in prices before and after the 
implementation of the RP reform, using panel data and a treatment group, for drugs 
subjected to RP, and a control group for drugs not subject to the RP reform. The authors 
estimate that the effect of the RP reform was an average price reduction of about 24%, 
and that RP triggers a stronger price reduction in brand-names, 30%, than in generics, 
19%. The authors also find that the prices on products that are therapeutic substitutes to 
those included in the RP system also responded to the reform: in particular, while the 
effect on branded therapeutic substitutes in not statistically significant, the therapeutic 
substitute generics reduced prices of 6.4%. The authors conclude that RP stimulates 
generic competition and is more effective in lowering drug prices than a price-cap 
regulation. 
 
2.2.2. Effects on quantities and total expenditure 
 
General overview. According to the results reported by the systematic review for the 
Cochrane Collaboration by Aaserud, Dahlgren, Kosters, Oxman, Ramsay and Sturm 
(2008), the average effect on drug use six months after the transition period following 
the introduction of RP is a relative increase in the level of use of referenced drugs 
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estimated between 87% and 251%, a relative decrease in the level of use of cost-share 
drugs estimated between -35% and -41%. Aaserud, Dahlgren, Kosters, Oxman, Ramsay 
and Sturm (2008) also report that the average effect on drug expenditures six months 
after the transition period following the introduction of RP is a relative decrease 
estimated between -18% and -47%, and that the associated savings in drug expenditures 
are estimated between a relative decrease of -3% and a relative increase of 48%.  
The estimation of the impact changes strongly according to the type of RP under 
analysis. In generic referencing, where the RP applies only to off-patent chemicals, the 
literature shows a slow but constant reallocation of the demand towards products still 
under patent protection. It is not clear, however, how much of this replacement is 
actually due to the RP. Formal DD analyses are missing on this issue. In a therapeutic 
referencing, on the other hand, it is logical to expect consistent savings in public/private 
expenditure, but no real effect on the overall number of prescription can be expected ex 
ante. Some evidence seems to confirm this point (Schneeweiss et al, 2003), although 
some other studies found a low but not null elasticity in the overall demand for a whole 
therapeutic category (Puig-Junoy, 2007). 
 
The wide range of results reflects also the lack of clear-cut evidence. Appropriate BA or 
DD studies on the topic are rare. The most convincing evidence in terms of 
methodological appropriateness comes from Canada (Schneeweiss and colleagues, 
2002-2003; Grootendorst and colleagues, 2005-2006) and Spain (Puig-Junoy, 2007). 
Although the lack of more formal approaches does not represent a problem when the 
outcome is price, quantities and expenditure are more difficult to evaluate. First of all, 
data do not generally show evident breaks in the overall market trends. Secondly, while 
for prices variations are rare, for quantities variability is high and in most cases 
researchers can rely only on few covariates for explaining high levels of variance. 
Conclusions are thus less robust and self-evident than in the analyses of prices. 
 
Germany 
The RP was introduced in 1989. Germany applied RP sequentially to different 
categories of products. Class 1 includes products with the same active ingredient 
(generic equivalents), Class 2 applies to therapeutically and pharmacologically similar 
active ingredients, and Class 3 applies to compounds with comparable therapeutic 
effect, especially combinations. Class 3 RP is rarely applied. The level of the RP is 
found as a weighted average (cobb-douglas) of existing prices. Pharmacists can not 
substitute (until 2001).  
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; REV) observe that series of aggregate data for the 
period 1988-1992 show that, with the only exception of 1989, the rate of growth of the 
total pharmaceutical expenditure remained unaltered after the introduction of RP.  
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Ulrich and Wille (1996; REV) show that drug spending between 1992 and 1993 
declined as a percentage of total healthcare spending, from 16.1% to 13.1%.  
 
Belien (1996; REV) and Schoffski (1996; REV) observe that, while reimbursed 
pharmaceutical expenditure was steadily increasing from DM13.8 billion in 1981 to 
DM20.6 billion in 1988, following the introduction of RP in 1989, reimbursed 
pharmaceutical expenditure was DM20.7 billion and notice that this decline in the rate 
of increase was not maintained in the following years, a period of increasing inflation. 
 
von der Schulenberg (1997; REV) points out that, although RP resulted in substantial 
savings in 1993, there are claims that compensatory increased occurred in costs of drugs 
not subject to RP, patient referrals and hospital admissions.  
 
Bloor, Maynard and Freemantle (1996; REV) and Drummond, Jonsson and Rutten 
(1997; REV) observe that in 1996 prescription drugs regulated by RP represented 61.4% 
of total drug sales in Germany. Nerine and Sen (1997; REV) observe that the savings in 
the categories of products subject to RP estimated on July 1993 were a figure about 
DM1.5 million per year, amounting on average to 15% of the total expenditure. 
 
Schneeweiss, Schoffski and Selke (1998; DES) observe an absence of significant effects 
on the volumes and estimate the total savings for the pharmaceutical expenditure in 
about DM425 million per year due to the initial implementation of phase 1 RP. 
 
Dickson and Redwood (1998; DES) show, with time series data from the public health 
body GKV that, with the only exception of 1989, the rate of growth of the total 
pharmaceutical expenditure in the years 1990-1992 was higher than the average one 
during the 7 years before the introduction of RP. 
VFA (2000; REV) reports total savings from RP at DM3.1 billion in 1999, 
approximately 19.7% of retail pharmacy sales at ex-factory prices. 
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe that in 1995 products subject to 
RP represented 66% of the total sickness funds expenditure on medicines, that public 
expenditure on drugs subject to RP showed a steady increase after an initial reduction 
and that total savings in period 1992-1994 was a figure of about DM5 billion, consisting 
in a saving of DM3 billion from altered prescribing behaviour by doctors, DM1 billion 
from substitution of products with identical active compounds and DM1 billion from 
the increased charges on patients. 
 
Giuliani, Selke and Garattini (1998; DES) study data from official statistics on 
consumption and average prices per Defined Daily Dose (DDD) (which is the 
therapeutical daily dose of active ingredient usually taken by a patient for a given 
pathology) in period 1989-96 for drugs within 8 therapeutic groups: beta-blockers, 
calcium antagonists, non-opiate analgesics, oral hypoglicemics, NSAIDs, expectorants, 
coronary dilators and systemic antibiotics. The authors observe an increase in the 
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consumption volumes (per DDD) within all the therapeutic groups. The authors observe 
that the pharmaceutical expenditure slightly decreased, or remain steady, in three 
therapeutic groups only (non-opiate analgesics, NSAIDs and coronary dilators), for 
which the decrease in average prices prevailed on the increased in volumes, despite an 
increase in DDDs prescribed for the first two of these groups. The authors notice, 
however, that within all the other five therapeutic groups’ expenditure increased. In 
particular, turnover of oral hypoglycaemic slightly dropped immediately after the RP 
introduction, mainly due to glibenclamide. The turnover of this group, however, 
increased significantly in the later years, with a sizeable growth of DDDs prescribed. 
Beta-blockers, calcium antagonists and expectorants did not decline at all in the short 
term. Finally, both turnover and DDDs grew at a considerable rate for antibiotics. The 
authors conclude that expenditure of drugs subject to RP showed a steady increase after 
an initial reduction, mainly due to volume growth.  
 
Danzon (2001; REV) observes that, although the RP system reduced prices for reference 
priced products, total expenditure continued to rise initially, because for the phase 1 RP, 
generics already accounted for over 50% of scripts in 1989, so that the potential phase 1 
savings from reducing brand-name drugs’ prices and volumes were already small. The 
author notices that, in general, RP cannot be expected to control expenditures because it 
has no direct effect on volume and structural shift, the main driver of pharmaceutical 
expenditures in Germany. Moreover, the author argues that, until the 1993 drug budgets, 
RP might have increased volume because drugs under RP were exempt from the co-
payment of DM3, and RP might also have encouraged switching to non-referenced 
products, which entailed no risk of explanation requirements for doctors or excess 
charges for patients. The author observes that, consistent with this, data on the 
components of expenditure growth show an increase in the inter-drug effect, that is 
switching to more expensive products, in 1991-1992, compared to 1987-1990. 
 
Petkanchin (2006; REV) points out that RP policy may have saved to compulsory health 
insurance funds in Germany more than €15 billion from its establishment in 1989 up to 
2002.  
 
The Netherlands 
A RP was introduced in 1991. The Dutch RP system included almost all on-patent and 
off-patent drugs. Classification decisions were made by the Ministry of Health, with 
input from a panel of medical advisors. The RP level is set as a median of existing 
prices. In 1996 maximum wholesale price policy was introduced. 
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; DES) find no significant impact of the introduction 
of RP on pharmaceutical volumes.  
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Bloor, Maynard and Freemantle (1996; DES) notice that, although the overall drug 
expenditure increased by 11% from 1991 to 1992, the costs of drugs covered by RP 
increased less than predicted, while the costs of non-classified drugs increased by more 
than 20% per annum since 1988.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe that whereas, prior to the 
Medicines Reimbursement System, expenditure increased by 11.2% from 1989 to 1990 
and by 8.3% from 1990 and 1991, pharmaceutical expenditure increased by 11.7% and 
11.2% in 1992 and 1993, respectively.  
 
Danzon (2001; DES) observes that that RP had at most modest effects on expenditure 
trends. In fact, the author reports that expenditure on pharmaceutical grew by 11.2% 
from 1989 to 1990, by 8.3% in 1991, with RP in effect for 6 months, but accelerated to 
11.1% in 1992, with most of the growth in the unclustered drugs. Moreover, the author 
observes that, in period 1989-93, RP had no lasting effect on volume and argues that 
this appears to be a perverse effect on price change, which was negative in 1989 and 
1990, before RP, and slightly positive for 1991-93, after the introduction of RP. The 
author also reports that, from 1994 to 1997, average expenditure growth was 5.6% per 
year and notices that strong structural growth, due to volume increases and a shift to 
newer products, were offset by a 5% price cut in 1994, reduction in pack size in 1994 
and the 15% price cut following the Maximum Price Law in 1996. Thus the author 
argues that, to the extent that the Netherlands has had negative price growth, this 
reflects pure price controls superimposed on RP and that the effect of RP appears to had 
been largely a one-off price reduction for branded products at the outset, followed by a 
second round of price cuts after the RP levels were reduced in 1999.  
 
New Zealand 
Reference pricing was introduced in July 1993. All reimbursed products are assigned to 
therapeutic subgroups with similar health effects. Patent status is not considered. New 
Zealand sets the RP at the lowest price in each subgroup, regardless of patent status. 
Generic substitution rules permit the pharmacist to substitute generics unless the 
physician explicitly prescribes the brand. 
 
Pharmac (1996; DES) estimates that, in the 1995-96 financial year, savings attributed to 
RP were about NZ$48 million and notices that, although the growth rate on drug 
spending had slowed, the trend had continued upward at a rate exceeding inflation: for 
instance, for the period March 1995 to March 1996, the growth rate was 8.15% and 
pharmaceutical expenditure was approximately NZ$716 million. 
  
Braae, McNee and Moore (1999; DES) and Martin and Begg (2000; DES) estimate that 
the average growth rate from 1993 to 1998 was 5%, with a decrease of approximately 
5% between 1998 and 1999.  
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Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) report that from June 1993 to June 
1994, the subsidy per head, corrected for population aged more than 60 years, increased 
by 11% but declined by -0.6% from June 1994 to June 1995. 
 
Danzon (2001; DES) observes that the average annual percentage increase in 
government pharmaceutical expenditures for the period 1987-96 was 4.7% in nominal 
terms and 0.7% in real terms, after adjusting for CPI inflation. Moreover, the author 
calculate that, adjusting for population, the real rate of growth of spending per capita is -
0.2% on average in that period. The author notices, however, that breaking down the 
overall average into three-year subperiods, indicates a slower real rate of growth for the 
period 1987-93, before the launch of RP, compared to 1993-96, the first three years of 
RP under Pharmac. This evidence, according to the author, casts doubt on the charge 
that real expenditure per capita was growing excessively prior to 1993 and that Pharmac 
significantly reduced the rate of growth, at least during the first three years of RP. The 
author also observes that, in period from 1993 to 2000, the price index has declined, but 
total spending has increased, reflecting growth in volume and mix.  
 
Sweden 
The RP was introduced in 1993 and dropped in 2002. It was a generic referencing, i.e. it 
applied only to products with expired patents and generic equivalents (same form, same 
active substance and same quality).  
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; DES), looking at series of aggregate data, notice 
that RP had only a temporary effect on the pharmaceutical expenditure. In fact, the 
authors report that in 1993, the year of introduction of RP, the rate of growth of the total 
expenditure, 12.7%, was lower than in the previous year, 15.3%. However, the authors 
notice that such an effect disappeared in the immediately following year, when the rate 
of growth followed the previous trend and reached the highest level of the five previous 
years, 15.8%. Moreover, the authors observe that, from 1993, the prescribing mix 
component of the total expenditure increased its relative importance. The authors also 
observe that the lower expenditures in the products subject to RP were more than 
compensated by the higher expenditures in the drugs not subject to RP. 
 
Liungkvist, Andersson and Gunnarsson (1997, DES) estimate that savings in the 
national drug bill were about SEK400 million in 1993 and a further SEK50 million in 
1994, while no further significant savings were expected with the current RP system, 
and observe that, despite RP, the yearly percentage change of pharmaceutical costs in 
1993-95 ranged from 12.7% to 15.8%, which were similar to the range 10.6-15.3% 
from 1988 to 1992.  
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Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) report that the total change in public 
expenditure in 1993 was a reduction of SEK485 million and that the factors contributing 
to such change were the price reductions (-SEK305 million); the costs over RP charged 
to the consumers (-SEK30 million); the switch to less expensive drugs (-SEK80 
million); and the drugs falling outside the reimbursement system (-SEK70 million). The 
authors also observe that the change in public expenditure also implied a corresponding 
change in the distribution of the financing burden, implying reduced revenues for the 
pharmaceutical industry (-SEK300 million) and for the pharmacies (-SEK85 million) 
and an increased expenditure for patients (SEK100 million). Moreover, the authors 
report that the total reimbursement saving for the period 1993 to 1996 can be estimated 
at about SEK1 billion. 
 
Denmark 
The RP was introduced in 1993. Products are grouped on the basis of type of pack. All 
products, which have at least one copy version, including generics and parallel imports, 
are included. The RP is the average of the two cheapest drugs in the market. 
Pharmacists have the right of substitution.  
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; DES), using series of aggregate data, observe that, 
in 1993, the year of introduction of RP, the rate of growth of total pharmaceutical 
expenditure, 4.5%, was lower than the rates of growth in the two years before, 15% and 
9.8% for 1991 and 1992, respectively, although the rate was higher, 5.4%, in the 
following year, 1994.  
 
Clausen (1995; REV) observes that, despite having decreased the price levels of the 
relevant drugs, public expenditure still increased, partly due to the prescribing of new 
and more expensive drugs. Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe that 
in the first year after RP, growth in pharmaceutical expenditure was lower than at any 
point in the previous six years.  
 
Australia 
RP was introduced in 1998. It is a therapeutic RP which applies to six therapeutic 
categories: H2 receptor antagonists (ulcer), statins, calcium channel blockers, ACE 
inhibitors, beta blockers (CVD). Pharmacist has the right to generic substitution. RP is 
the lowest price in the market.  
 
Ioannides-Demos, Ibrahim and McNeil (2002; REV) observe that in the financial year 
1996-97, healthcare expenditure in Australia was A$2863 million, whereas in 1997-98, 
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the year the Therapeutic Group Premiums Scheme was implemented, the total 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) costs increased to A$3097 million despite the 
prediction of costs savings of A$560 million over four years. The authors also observe 
that in 1999-2000, government expenditure for PBS prescriptions increased by 14% and 
that considerable cost savings occurred with therapeutic groups subject to RP: the only 
three therapeutic categories to grow more slowly in 1998 compared to 1997 were the 
three categories affected by Therapeutic Group Premiums: antiulcer agents, ACE 
inhibitors and calcium antagonists. On the other hand, the authors observe that the 
category that did not attract a Therapeutic Group Premium, the statins, showed an 
increased expenditure since the introduction of the scheme and was the drug group with 
the highest increased cost to the government in 1999-2000. The authors also notice that 
the latter increase in expenditure also reflected an increase in volume of prescriptions 
due to the expansion of indications to patients with existing coronary heart disease and 
to patients with a blood cholesterol level higher than 4 mmol/L. 
 
Canada (British Columbia) 
RP was introduced in 1995. Under Type 1 RP, only chemically equivalent drugs are 
considered interchangeable, either branded or generic versions of the same drug. 
Under Type 2 RP, all drugs from the same therapeutic class are considered 
interchangeable. This therapeutic RP applied to some specific clusters: H2 Antagonists, 
NSAIDs, ACE inhibitors, calcium channel blockers. Usually the reference for 
reimbursement is the least expensive product. Generic substitution is allowed.  
 
 
Boulet and Tessier (1997; REV) observe that total healthcare expenditure was 
approximately C$72 billion per annum in 1994 and that, although prescription drugs 
accounted for just over 5% of this expenditure, drugs represented the fastest growing 
proportion of total health spending.  
 
Vandergrift and Kanavos (1997; DES) observe that, since the introduction of the RP 
policy, prescribing of the reference anti-ulcer drug cimetidine increased 5 times, while 
prescribing for other drugs in the class decreased by over 50%; that prescribing for the 
sustained-release nitrates fell by more than 50% while that for the reference nitrate 
tripled, and that prescribing of less expensive NSAIDs saved over C$5 million.  
 
Maclure and Potashnik (1997; DES) estimate total drug savings in the first year in about 
C$30 million, approximately 7.5% of the drug budget, plus projected annual savings of 
C$14 million. Mullens (1998; DES) estimates cost savings in about C$74 million for 
the 2 years since the programme was launched, while McGregor (1998; DES) estimates 
the figure in about C$44 million per year.  
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Narine, Senathirajah and Smith (1999; REV) report that initial data from Pharmacare 
demonstrated an increase in prescriptions for drugs under RP and a decrease in drugs 
not subject to RP, with an associated decrease in annual costs for drugs within RP 
categories from C$42 million in the year before the introduction of RP to C$23.7 
million in 1996.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2000; REV) report that total drug expenditures were 
figures about C$406 million, C$396 million and C$430 million in financial years 1995-
96, 1996-97 and 1997-98, respectively, and that the government claimed to have saved 
C$30 million and C$44 million in the first and the second year, respectively, after the 
introduction of the RP system.  
 
Schneeweiss, Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn (2002; BA) analyze 
monthly data of claims from British Columbia for 24 months before and 12 months 
after implementation of RP and identify 119074 patients, 65 years of age or older, for 
whom at least one ACE inhibitor was dispensed between January 2005 and June 2008. 
For each of the 8 ACE inhibitors, the authors determine the median monthly dose 
(MMD, in mg) dispensed during the 8-month period from November 1995 to June 
1996, for patients who filled at least one prescription during a period of 120 days 
before, and a period of 120 days after the 8-month period. The authors observe that in 
January 1995, 1230 MMDs of cost-shared ACE inhibitors were dispensed per 10000 
patients and that such figure increased by 16 MMDs (1.3%) per month before RP 
became effective in January 1997. The authors find that, after a sharp drop of 462 
MMDs (29% of the predicted value) following the implementation of RP, the utilization 
rate stabilized at about 1150 MMDs, 38% below the rate projected for June 1997 on the 
basis of pre-RP data. In June 1997, mean monthly expenditure per patient was $9.40, 
19% less than the expenditure projected from the pre-RP trend, and the rate of increase 
($0.46 per patient per month) was also slightly lower than the projected trend. On the 
basis of the difference between observed expenditure and expenditures projected from 
pre-implementation trends, the authors estimate that cost savings to Pharmacare for all 
ACE inhibitors prescriptions was $6.7 million in the first year. 
 
Schneeweiss, Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn (2003; BA) select a 
cohort of 35886 patients, 65 years of age or older, who received a dihydropyridine 
calcium channel blockers (DCCBs) between December 1995 and March 1996. The 
authors define median monthly doses (MMDs) for each of 4 DCCBs as the median of 
all doses dispensed per month in mg averaged over a 8-month period starting on 
November 1995. The authors find that, after a sharp drop of 150 MMDs (21% of the 
predicted value) following the implementation of RP, the utilization rate stabilized at 
about 560 MMDs, 38% below the rate projected for June 1997 on the basis of pre-RP 
data. On the other hand, the authors find that while the use of no-cost DCCBs increased 
from 117 MMDs per 10000 patients during the pre-policy period by 1 MMD (0.9%) per 
month, during the 5 months after the introduction of RP, utilization increased by 19 
MMDs per month to 233 MMDs in April 1997, representing a 60% increase compared 
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with the predicted value in November 1996, just before the introduction of RP. 
Therefore, the authors find that the aggregate outcome of these two effects was that 
utilization of all DCCBs dropped from 823 MMDs per 10000 patients in November 
1996 to an average of 730 MMDs during the first 3 months after the policy, 
corresponding to a 11.3% decrease. After this transition period, the post-policy level 
rose to 780 MMDs in June 1997, still 9.3% below the expected value (860 MMDs) for 
June 1997 based on the projected pre-policy trend. The authors also report that there 
was a temporal decrease in average monthly expenditure per patient. 
 
Marshall, Grootendorst, O’Brien, Dolovich, Holbrook and Levy (2002; BA)consider 
aggregate monthly claims data, from January 1993 to May 1999, for hystamine-2 
receptor antagonists (H2RAs), proton pump inhibitors (PPIs), sucralfate, prokinetic 
agents and misoprostol, from Pharmacare, the publicly funded drug subsidy program for 
seniors and various other residents of British Columbia. The data included the numbers 
of prescriptions and unit doses dispensed, the costs reimbursed by Pharmacare and the 
payments made by the beneficiaries. The authors analyzed claims data only for patients 
65 years of age or older. For both H2RAs and PPIs, expenditure trends observed in the 
first 3 periods were estimated with regression models and then projected forward to 
predict the expenditures that would likely have accrued in the absence of policies. The 
authors consider the 12-month period from September 1994 to August 1995 as baseline. 
During such baseline period, the mean monthly number of DDD of H2RAs prescribed 
was 137855 per 100000 senior beneficiaries, of which 24536 (18%) were for the 
reference standard, cimetidne. From the baseline period to the 12-month period 
immediately after implementation of RP (January to December 1996) there was only a 
modest 21% increase in the mean monthly number of DDD of H2RAs dispensed, but 
there were pronounced changes in the mix of individual H2RAs. For instance, mean 
monthly cimetidine prescriptions raised by 379%, whereas prescribing of restricted 
H2RAs fell by 55%. The mean monthly number of DDD of PPIs prescribed fell by 26% 
in the 12-month period after RP implementation, but climbed to 9% over baseline in the 
follow-up period. A 300% increase in monthly Pharmacare expenditures for cimetidine 
was offset by lower expenditures for restricted H2RAs. Thus, overall monthly 
expenditures for H2RAs fell to 58% of baseline in the 12-month period after the 
implementation of RP, and remained low in the follow-up period. In contrast, monthly 
expenditures for PPIs fell to 74% of baseline in the 12 months after implementation of 
the special authority policy, but rose to 107% of baseline in the subsequent follow-up 
period. The projections of trends in expenditure from before to after the change in 
policy for H2RAs and PPIs revealed that for H2RAs the total estimated savings for the 
period January 1996 to May 1999, were between C$1.8 million per year, while for PPIs, 
they were C$5.5 million per year.  
 
Grootendorts, Marshall, Holbrook, Dolovich, O’Brien and Levy (2005; BA) consider 
monthly data over the period February 1993 to June 2001 from retrospective 
population-based claims, to examine patterns of drugs’ prices under the application of 
RP by Pharmacare, the publicly funded drug subsidy program for seniors and various 
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other residents of British Columbia. The authors consider the application of RP to the 
nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs (NSAIDs). The authors find that Type 2 RP 
appeared to have little effect on the total volume of NSAIDs dispensed and that most of 
the savings from the introduction of RP were attributable to substitutions of low cost 
unrestricted for higher cost restricted NSAIDs. The authors also notice that rates of 
prescribing unrestricted NSAIDs doubled after the introduction of Type 2 RP. The 
authors estimate total savings of C$7.5 million for Type 1 RP and C$22.7 million for 
Type 2 RP. The annualized savings amounted to C$1 million and C$4 million, 
respectively, corresponding to about 11% and 44% of the C$9.1 million Pharmacare 
spent on NSAIDs in the 12 months prior to Type 2 RP. The authors notice, however, that 
some of the savings attributed to Type 2 RP, an annual estimate of about C$400000, 
were actually because of the delisting of the second line restricted NDAIDs.  
 
Grootendorst and Stewart (2006; DD) critically assess the identifying assumption 
inherent in the “before and after” (BA) design, namely that pre-RP trends accurately 
predict counterfactual outcomes. The authors estimate the impact of RP on expenditure 
on ACE inhibitors and calcium channel blockers (CCBs) by Pharmacare, the publicly 
funded plan for seniors and various other residents of British Columbia. The authors 
also use similar data from a public plan in Ontario (Ontario Drug Benefit plan) that had 
not introduced RP, to estimate the effects on drug expenditures of patent expiration, 
secular changes in prescribing patterns and various other factors common to all 
Canadian public drug plans that could potentially confound the BA estimates of the 
effect of RP on drug plan expenditures. Using monthly data from January 1994 to 
December 2000, the authors estimate the reduction in prices attributable to RP by a DD 
estimator. The authors observe that the introduction of RP did not appear to 
substantially affect dispensing volumes for ACE inhibitors or CCB. The authors notice, 
however, that RP appears to have large effects on the mix of high- and low-cost drugs 
dispensed within each category. The substitution of lower cost for higher-cost drugs, 
coupled with the reduced reimbursement of higher-cost drugs for non-expemted 
beneficiaries, had the effect of lowering average expenditure per day of ACE inhibitor 
and CCB therapy. They estimate that the application of RP to ACE inhibitors reduced 
Pharmacare expenditure over the 4-years period between January 1997 to December 
2000 by about C$10 million, while the corresponding savings estimate for CCBs was in 
order of C$8 million. The authors also notice that savings declined over time.  
 
Spain 
A RP system was effectively introduced in Spain in December 2000. This system is 
applied to off-patent drugs with the same active ingredient. Initially, the RP was 
calculated on the basis of the weighted average (year on year) of the lowest-priced 
products that account for at least 20% of the market sales.  
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Puig-Junoy (2007; DD) aims at evaluating the intended and unintended impact on 
pharmaceutical use and volume of sales of the Spanish generic RP system for statins. 
The author develops a DD analysis of 46 monthly drug use and volume of sales ratios, 
from January 2001 to October 2004, valued at regulated ex-factory prices. Data are 
from IMS, a marketing research company, and from the centralized National Health 
System pharmaceutical consumption database of the Spanish Ministry of Health. The 
author calculates that, while in January 2001, average volume of sales valued at 
regulated ex-factory prices per 1000 inhabitants was €696.9 in the rest of Spain and 
20.7% lower in the Andalusian Public Health Service (APHS), at the end of the study 
period, October 2004, monthly volume of sales per capita was significantly higher than 
at the beginning (€943.9 in the rest of the Spanish Health System (SHS) and €772.8 in 
the APHS), but the average difference between the two regions had narrowed slightly 
(18.1%). For statins as a whole, volume of sales increased during this period by 35.4% 
in the rest of Spain and 39.8% in Andalusia. Moreover, the author observes that the 
largest increase in volume of sales and number of prescriptions for 1000 inhabitants was 
observed for the two on-patent statins, namely fluvastatin and atorvastatin. Importantly, 
the paper shows that the overall dispensed quantities of statins are not inelastic to price 
variations: price reductions of lovastatin forced or induced by RP interventions were 
accompanied by a reduction in the number of prescriptions of this first off-patent statin 
(6.5% in SHS and 24.3% in APHS), although the other statins maintained their time 
trend growth as observed before RP. The author also notices that, in contrast, price 
reduction of simvastatin was accompanied by a slight increase in its growth rate (86.4% 
in the rest of Spain, 21.5% in APHS), and also a slight decrease in the number of 
prescriptions of atorvarstatin, the top-selling on patent statin. The author concludes that 
the market demand for a given drug, that is the combined demand for the original drug 
and its generic substitute, is not perfectly inelastic in relation to its own price change 
induced by RP. Finally, the author calculates that, in the rest of the Spanish Health 
System, the mean monthly saving for the 12 and 10 months, respectively, after 
intervention attributed to the initial application of RP to lovastatin and simvastatin were 
16.7% and 51.8%, respectively, of total sales of those drugs, representing 1.1% and 
13.9%, respectively, of total volume of sales of statins. 
  
Ubeda, Cardo, Selles, Broseta, Trillo and Fernandez-LLimos (2007; DES) describe the 
evolution of antidepressant use in primary care in the Valencian region from 2000 to 
2004 and analyze the effects of the introduction of RP and generic drugs on drug 
utilization and cost saving. The authors analyze the prescription pattern of 
antidepressants using sales collected for the period 2000-04, converted into DDD per 
1000 inhabitants according to the methodology by the WHO Centre for Drugs Statistics. 
The authors report that antidepressants represented around 4.5-5% of the total drug 
expenditure of the Valencian region (€1316 million in 2004), which, in turn, represented 
about 29% of the Valencian public health budget. The authors observe that the total cost 
of prescribed antidepressants in the Valencian region steadily increased from 2000 to 
2003, from €40 million to €59 million, at constant prices, and remained at this point in 
2004, representing an increase of 47%. Therefore, the authors argue that even though 
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the lowered cost of many medicines implied by the introduction of RP had not reduced 
pharmaceutical expenditure, at least it helped to moderate its increase. The authors 
observe a trend towards an increase in the utilization of other antidepressants, such as 
venlafaxine and escitalopram, which were not affected by the RP policy, an undesirable 
effect as it does not usually correlate with a significant improvement in effectiveness 
and involves increased costs. The authors estimate that, during the analyzed 5-years 
period, the reduction of fluoxetine’s cost/DDD represented an approximate saving of 
€8.6 million for the Valencian Health System. However, they also point out that the 
impact that RP had on fluoxetine utilization might have contributed to the progressive 
reduction in its total market share (while generic use reached a relevant level, about 
33% in 5 years). The authors also argue that, through the strategy to lower their prices, 
brand-name drugs manufacturers attempted to avoid the substitution for the alternative 
generic and were able to maintain loyalty to the trade mark: in the case of brand-name 
fluoxetine, for instance, this explains why prices were reduced for the original products 
and not for the orally disintegrating fluoxetine tablets, which were not interchangeable 
by generic forms. The authors conclude that the above displacement of drugs included 
in this system to other new higher-priced medicines might have contributed to the 
yearly increase in average cost per prescription, that was 2.5% in 2000, 3.3% in 2002 
and 4.98% in 2003.  
 
 
Italy 
In Italy the RP was introduced in December 2001. It applies to off-patent drugs only 
(same dosage, same pack). The RP is the minimum price in the market. Pharmacists are 
allowed to substitute.  
 
Ghislandi, Krulichova and Garattini (2005) show data on prices and volumes from 
January 2001 to April 2003 for the commonest packs of the top three active substances 
in terms of revenue, with at least one generic version: tipoclidine, nimesulide and 
ranitidine. The authors observe that the impact of RP on the total sales volumes of the 
three substances is more uneven than for the prices, depending on the different 
competitive scenarios and, in particular, the existence of under-patent “me-too”drugs. 
The authors notice, for instance, that the sharp drop in total volumes of ranitidine may 
be explained by the availability of many in-patent drugs with the same therapeutic 
indication (such as omeprazole and its derivatives), strongly promoted by companies to 
avoid price competition. 
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Belgium 
The RP was first introduced in 2001. It is a generic referencing, i.e. the RP applies to 
drugs with the same active compound. The RP is initially set 16% lower than the 
branded product’s price. Over time, the Belgian government has progressively reduced 
the level of the RP. Generic substitution is allowed. 
  
Simoens, De Bruyn, Bogaert and Laekeman (2005; DES) analyze data on general trends 
and on evolution of particular drug classes. The former data are from IMS Health 
Belgium and relate to drug consumption of a representative panel of 2550 community 
pharmacies, about 50% of all Belgian pharmacies. The latter data are from Ifstat 
database, which brings together data on reimbursable drugs transmitted by community 
pharmacies to the third-party payer for the purpose of reimbursement. The authors 
report an interesting case study concerning lisinopril, an ACE inhibitor, after the 
introduction of its generic versions in the Belgian market in October 2002. The authors 
report that, on the one hand, the price of Zestril, one of two original lisinopril drugs was 
dropped to around the price level of generic versions of lisinopril in return for 
unconditional prescriptions, thereby sustaining its consumption in terms of DDDs. On 
the other hand, the authors report that Novatec, the other original drug, upheld its price 
and its prescription continued to be subject to “Chapter IV” regulation, thus translating 
into a 43% reduction in consumption of Novatec. The authors observe that, focusing on 
those active principles for which generic drugs are available, expenditure on original 
drugs fell significantly. The authors argue that the difference in the expenditurerepresent 
net savings to the third-party payer as a result of generic competition. The authors 
calculate that, expressing savings as a proportion of expenditure on all drugs, rather than 
expenditure on active principles for which generic drugs are available, the introduction 
of RP scheme was associated with savings amounting to 1.8% of pharmaceutical 
expenditure by the third-party payer in 2001 and to 2.1% in 2002. The authors argue 
that these findings indicate that the fall in expenditure on original drugs exceeded 
increased expenditure on generic drugs as a result of the lower price of generic drugs, 
thereby generating savings to the third-party payer. 
 
Hungary 
The first version of the RP was introduced in 1999. It was a generic referencing (i.e. RP 
applies to drugs with the same chemical). In 2003, a therapeutic referencing (i.e. RP 
applies to a cluster of chemicals) was introduced for some groups (including statins). 
The RP is the cheapest drug with a cumulative market share of 50%.  
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Kalò, Muzbek, Bodrogi and Bidlò (2007; DES) analyze the Hungarian experience in 
introducing a therapeutic RP for statins in September 2003. The authors use as baseline 
period August 2003, the last month before the introduction of RP, and compare the 
average ex-factory and public prices, reimbursement level, patients’ co-payment and 
DDDs of prescribed units of statins with the ones in March 2004, using an IMS Health 
database built on sales reports of pharmaceutical wholesalers. The authors calculate that 
the price erosion of simvastatins resulted in €11.2 million savings over the 7-months 
investigation period. The authors, however, observe that, as a result of the fact that 
higher doses of the same substance became cheaper for the patients after the 
introduction of RP, many patients were switched from low to high dose statins, so that 
the DDD per prescriptions was increased by 45%, from 1.14 to 1.65. The majority of 
this DDD growth was driven by patented products such as atorvastatin and fluvastatin: 
the most striking change was the growth of atorvastatin DDD from 1.16 to 3.36. The 
authors also notice that therapeutic RP and the consequent DDD growth increased the 
statin sales by 55.9%. In fact, the average monthly –ex-factory sales of statins was 
€2809 million between February and August 2003, and €3553 million between 
September 2003 and March 2004, representing a 26.5% market growth. The authors 
conclude that overall the therapeutic RP in several therapeutic categories, affecting 
38.3% of the total public pharmaceutical budget, had limited impact on the nominal 
growth of pharmaceutical expenditure. Actual public pharmaceutical expenditure grew 
by 16.7% (or 10% in real terms) after excluding the impact of VAT increase in 2003-05, 
compared to 16.5% in between 1994 and 2002 (1.6% in real terms), despite the 
introduction and subsequent extension of therapeutic RP, and mandated 15% price cut 
over a 3-month period.  
 
Norway  
A version of the RP was introduced in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent drugs already 
facing generic competition in six chemical substances targeted for depression, anti-
ulcer, allergy, high blood pressure and nigh cholesterol. It was a generic a therapeutic 
referencing (i.e. RP applies to a cluster of chemicals). The RP is an index price 
calculated as the sales-weighted sum of producer prices included in each sub-group. 
The government decided to terminate the system at the end of 2004. 
 
Brekke, Grasdal and Holmas (2008; BA) use a dataset from Farmastat providing 
information, over the four-year period from 2001 through 2004, on sales value (in 
pharmacy purchase price); volume (in DDD) for each package of drugs sold on the 
Norwegian pharmaceutical market; name, manufacturer, package size, dosage and 
launch date of each drug; and on whether the product was a brand-name or a generic 
drug. The authors notice that, since total demand is highly price inelastic, the fact that 
RP is more effective in lowering drug prices than a price-cap regulation implies that RP 
is superior in reducing pharmaceutical expenditures. The authors notice that in 2002, the 
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total sales value of the drugs included in the RP system amounted in NOK 474.4 
million, with a brand-name market share of about 72%. The authors calculate cost 
savings for the introduction of RP system of about NOK 75 million, based upon their 
estimated price reductions of about 18% for brand-name drugs and 8% for generics. 
 
2.2.3. Other Effects  
 
General overview. Besides prices and quantities, the main two other issues considered 
in the literature are the impact of the RP on either generics' market shares or patients' 
health. From the literature, generics seem to gain market shares with the RP, although it 
must be pointed out that no study conducted a proper DD or BA analysis to test the 
hypothesis of a real impact of the RP. In general, however, it seems safe to claim that 
the demand for off-patent products is very elastic (in most situations brand-name prices 
highly above the reimbursement level have been associated to evident drops in market 
shares). On the other hand, the case of British Columbia provides the only significant 
studies of the effect of the RP on patients, showing that there is no evidence that the RP 
affects patients' health.  
 
Among the reviewed papers, one (Danzon and Ketcham, 2003) analyzes the impact on 
the RP on the launch of new pharmaceuticals. If the clusters in the RP are narrowly 
defined (e.g. generic referencing), the application of the RP should not affect the natural 
flow of innovation in a country. On the other hand, therapeutic referencing might create 
a strong disincentive to the launch of new products. These relations are confirmed by 
this first empirical inspection. However, they have never been replicated again by other 
studies. Moreover, conclusions are based on very simple correlation pattern, with no 
control for innovation patterns and quality of the compounds, so that further evidence is 
needed on this issue.  
 
In general, like for the two previous parts, the best studies in terms of appropriateness of 
the dataset and of the statistical analyses have been conducted in Canada (Schneeweiss, 
Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn, 2002; Schneeweiss, Soumerai, 
Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn, 2003), mainly because these studies are the only 
ones based on individual level data. 
 
Germany 
In Germany the RP was introduced in 1989. Germany applied RP sequentially to 
different categories of products. Class 1 includes products with the same active 
ingredient (generic equivalents), Class 2 applies to therapeutically and 
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pharmacologically similar active ingredients, and Class 3 applies to compounds with 
comparable therapeutic effect, especially combinations. Class 3 RP is rarely applied. 
The level of the RP is found as a weighted average (cobb-douglas) of existing prices. 
Pharmacists can not substitute (until 2001).  
 
 
Ulriche and Wille (1996; REV) report that, between 1989 and 1992, generic share of 
scripts for multisource compounds increased by 10.9%, from 53.2% to 58.3% of the 
market, whereas generics’ share of sales increased by 14.9%, from 42.2% to 48.5% of 
the market, consistent with a generic gain in volume share despite higher relative prices.  
 
Belien (1996; REV) observes that, by 1993, sales of the seven largest research-intensive 
drug manufacturers declined by 16.5%, while the sales of the four largest generic drugs 
firms increased by 36%.  
 
Maassen (1996; REV) points out that in the few cases in which pharmaceutical 
companies did not decreased drugs’ prices at the RP level, their products were affected 
by massive reduction in the market shares, and that even small differences in the prices 
charged to patients (e.g. DM3) implied large falls in the market shares. 
 
Schneeweiss, Schoffski and Selke (1998; DES) finds a considerable reduction of the 
sales for all the brand-name whose prices were not decreased at the RP level.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) report that the volume’s share of 
generics increased from 34% in 1991 to 38.6% in 1995, whereas the share of patent 
protected prescribed drugs increased from 11.7% in 1991 to 20% in 1995. 
 
Giuliani, Selke and Garattini (1998; DES) study data from official statistics on 
consumption and average prices per Defined Daily Dose (DDD) (which is the 
therapeutical daily dose of active ingredient usually taken by a patient for a given 
pathology) in period 1989-96 for drugs within 8 therapeutic groups: beta-blockers, 
calcium antagonists, non-opiate analgesics, oral hypoglicemics, NSAIDs, expectorants, 
coronary dilators and systemic antibiotics. The authors observe that sales of original 
branded products declined strongly, with decreases in both volume and prices. 
According to the authors, this probably reflected patients’ negative attitude towards co-
payment, which led companies to cut the prices of branded drugs down to the 
reimbursement level. The authors, however, observe that savings of drugs subject to RP 
were balanced by the growth of turnover of those not subject and argue that this 
probably resulted from an industrial strategy aimed at facing the RP constraints by 
launching new active ingredients, possibly adding little innovation but sustaining high 
prices. In particular, the authors observe that, for the calcium antagonists, the 
pharmaceutical companies in the period 1989-1994 launched six new calcium 
antagonists, all characterized by therapeutic effects similar to the drugs already present 
in the market, but not subject to RP. 
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Danzon and Ketcham (2003, DES) examine the hypothesis, common in the theoretical 
models but never tested in the empirical evidence, that widely defined RP clusters are 
associated to fewer launches of innovative pharmaceutical products. The sample used is 
a cross-section of many therapeutic groups for three countries: Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand. Authors look at the date of the first launch of the 
molecules in the market and relate this with the application of the RP in the country. 
Moreover, as a benchmark, they consider the launch lag relative to the launch in the US. 
For Germany, “the percent of molecules available does not show a strong trend after the 
introduction of reference pricing in 1989 compared to the pre-RP period, with roughly 
90 percent of compounds launched. After 1994, this declines to 68 percent of the post-
1994 cohort launched, which may reflect diffusion lags with censored data.” This result 
is interpreted as being the consequence of the relatively narrow definition of the RP 
effectively used in the German system (most of the compounds are included in Class 1 
type of RP).  
 
The Netherlands 
A RP was introduced in 1991. The Dutch RP system included almost all on-patent and 
off-patent drugs. Classification decisions were made by the Ministry of Health, with 
input from a panel of medical advisors. The RP level is set as a median of existing 
prices. In 1996 maximum wholesale price policy was introduced. 
 
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995; DES) find no significant impact of the introduction 
of RP on physicians’ prescribing mix.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe that in 1993-1995 market 
shares of cheaper generics and parallel import drugs increased by 40%.  
 
Danzon (2001; REV) observes that the authorization of pharmacists to substitute 
generics and parallel imports resulted in competitive discounting to pharmacists, but the 
RP system was not well designed to take advantage of this for payers and consumers. 
 
Danzon and Ketcham (2003, DES) examine the hypothesis, common in the theoretical 
models but never tested in the empirical evidence, that widely defined RP clusters are 
associated to fewer launches of innovative pharmaceutical products. The sample used is 
a cross-section of many therapeutic groups for three countries: Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand. Authors look at the date of the first launch of the 
molecules in the market and relate this with the application of the RP in the country. 
Moreover, as a benchmark, they consider the launch lag relative to the launch in the US. 
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For the Netherlands, it is found that the molecules launched after the introduction of 
reference pricing in 1991 (59-60 percent) compared to 78 percent in 1987-1990, 
immediately prior to RP, are fewer, suggesting that “the Netherlands’ requirement that 
most new products join established RP clusters as a condition of reimbursement 
deterred the launch of some new compounds.”  
New Zealand 
Reference pricing was introduced in July 1993. All reimbursed products are assigned to 
therapeutic subgroups with similar health effects. Patent status is not considered. New 
Zealand sets the RP at the lowest price in each subgroup, regardless of patent status. 
Generic substitution rules permit the pharmacist to substitute generics unless the 
physician explicitly prescribes the brand. 
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) observe a low market penetration of 
generics, consistent with their low, not favourable, price differential. 
 
Danzon (2001; DES) reports that in 1997, Pharmac considered 84 applications for 
subsidy, of which 55 were listed and 29 were declined, implying an acceptance rate of 
65%. The author also notices that of the 97 applications declined between 1994 and 
1997, 42 (43%) were for new chemical entities (NCEs) and the remainder were for new 
presentations or new products of existing compounds. The author argues that these data 
suggest that Pharmac significantly restricted entry, both for new compounds and for 
new forms of old compounds. The author also argues that the evidence from countries 
with competitive retail pharmacy sectors and hence competitive generic markets (such 
as United States, United Kingdom, Canada) indicates that restrictions on new forms of 
old compounds restrict competition, leading to foregone savings on off-patent 
compounds, which is contrary to the stated objective of RP. 
 
Danzon and Ketcham (2003, DES) examine the hypothesis, common in the theoretical 
models but never tested in the empirical evidence, that widely defined RP clusters are 
associated to fewer launches of innovative pharmaceutical products. The sample used is 
a cross-section of many therapeutic groups for three countries: Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand. Authors look at the date of the first launch of the 
molecules in the market and relate this with the application of the RP in the country. 
Moreover, as a benchmark, they consider the launch lag relative to the launch in the US. 
For New Zealand, it is found that only 12% of the molecule launched in the US between 
1995 and 1998 was launched in the country. Before 1991, before the RP was introduced, 
the same value was 60%. Authors also show that there is a positive correlation between 
the relative RP levels and number of compounds launched, interpreting the results as 
evidence that launched are either delayed or cancelled because of excessively low 
reimbursement prices. Note, however, that the quality of the new compounds is not 
controlled for in any way and that authors do not distinguish between firms’ decision 
not to launch and authorities’ decision not to reimburse.  
 
 
 
 
100
Sweden 
The RP was introduced in 1993 and dropped in 2002. It was a generic referencing, i.e. it 
applied only to products with expired patents and generic equivalents (same form, same 
active substance and same quality).  
 
Jonsson (1994) observes that the total market share of the brand-name products 
decreased from 65% in 1992 to 51% of 1993, while the generics’ market share increased 
from 35% in 1992 to 49% in 1993.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001) observe that, while, in 1993, sales growth in 
the segment of products not subject to RP was 18.3% and in the overall Swedish market 
was 12.6%, drug sales under the RP system increased in volume by 4.6% and decreased 
in cost by 16.9%. 
 
Denmark 
No evidence found in the literature. 
 
Australia 
RP was introduced in 1998. It is a therapeutic RP which applies to six therapeutic 
categories: H2 receptor antagonists (ulcer), statins, calcium channel blockers, ACE 
inhibitors, beta blockers (CVD). Pharmacist has the right to generic substitution. RP is 
the lowest price in the market.  
 
Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) report an increase in the market share of 
generic drugs from 12% up to 19% of the market. 
 
Canada (British Columbia) 
RP was introduced in 1995. Under Type 1 RP, only chemically equivalent drugs are 
considered interchangeable, either branded or generic versions of the same drug. 
Under Type 2 RP, all drugs from the same therapeutic class are considered 
interchangeable. This therapeutic RP applied to some specific clusters: H2 Antagonists, 
NSAIDs, ACE inhibitors, calcium channel blockers. Usually the reference for 
reimbursement is the least expensive product. Generic substitution is allowed.  
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Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2001; REV) point out that, since British Columbia 
already had the highest generic substitution rate in Canada before the implementation of 
RP, with generics representing a share of 45% of all prescribed drugs in December 
1995, the effect on generics was minimal.  
 
Schneeweiss, Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn (2002; BA) analyze 
monthly data of claims from British Columbia for 24 months before and 12 months 
after implementation of RP and identify 119074 patients, 65 years of age or older, for 
whom at least one ACE inhibitor was dispensed between January 2005 and June 2008. 
The authors find that patients with low-income status were the most likely to either 
switch to no-cost ACE inhibitors or to stop any antihypertensive therapy. However, this 
group also had a greater rate of discontinuation of antihypertensive therapy 7 and 12 
months before implementation of RP. In general, after RP patients were more likely to 
either change to other groups of anti-hypertensives or stop their therapy. However, 46% 
of patients maintained cost-shared ACE inhibitors despite higher out-of-pocket 
payments, also because a part of these were probably covered by additional insurance. 
 
Schneeweiss, Soumerai, Maclure, Dormuth, Walker and Glynn (2003; BA) select a 
cohort of 35886 patients, 65 years of age or older, who received a dihydropyridine 
calcium channel blockers (DCCBs) between December 1995 and March 1996. The 
authors find almost no switching from cost-shared DCCBs to no-cost drugs before the 
policy intervention, but a rapid increase in switching immediately after the policy 
implementation: 6% of cost-shared DCCB users switched to no-cost DCCBs each 
month. Among the 23116 prevalent users of high-priced cost-shared DCCBs, 76.9% 
continued to take their cost-shared DCCBs, 9.3% changed to no-cost DCCBs, 5.8% 
switched to another antihypertensive medication class, 5.1% switched to nitrates and 
3% stopped all antihypertensive drug treatment. The authors did not observe any 
increase in physician visits in the entire cohort of patients subject to policy. However, 
switchers had 18% increase in physician visits compared to non-switchers during the 
first 2 months after policy. The authors, did neither detect any increase in 
hospitalizations overall or through the emergency department, nor in admissions to 
long-term care facilities.  
 
 
Spain 
A RP system was effectively introduced in Spain in December 2000. This system is 
applied to off-patent drugs with the same active ingredient. Initially, the RP was 
calculated on the basis of the weighted average (year on year) of the lowest-priced 
products that account for at least 20% of the market sales.  
 
Puig-Junoy (2007; DD) develops a DD analysis of 46 monthly drug use and volume of 
sales ratios, from January 2001 to October 2004, valued at regulated ex-factory prices. 
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Data are from IMS, a marketing research company, and from the centralized National 
Health System pharmaceutical consumption database of the Spanish Ministry of Health. 
The author shows that market shares for generics in the off-patent chemicals (lovastatin 
and simvastatin) increased constantly over time after patent expiry (from 4% to 18% for 
lovastatin and from 0% to 23% for simvastatin). However, he does not test formally the 
hypothesis that the RP had an impact in the generics' market share trend.  
 
 
Italy 
In Italy the RP was introduced in December 2001. It applies to off-patent drugs only 
(same dosage, same pack). The RP is the minimum price in the market. Pharmacists are 
allowed to substitute.  
 
Ghislandi, Krulichova and Garattini (2005) show data on prices and volumes from 
January 2001 to April 2003 for the commonest packs of the top three active substances 
in terms of revenue, with at least one generic version: tipoclidine, nimesulide and 
ranitidine. The authors observe that generics gained market shares in all three cases, 
with a greater increase where the price gap between generics and originators was larger. 
The authors also notice that, despite these successful examples, the overall market for 
reimbursed generics was still under-developed in Italy, being their share of public 
pharmaceutical expenditure only 1.2% in 2002. They observe that, while part of the 
reasons for this delay is due to longer patent protection (and thus less off-patent 
chemical in the whole market), the fact that most brand-name products reduced their 
price to the RP negatively affected the development of the market for generics.  
 
Belgium 
The RP was first introduced in 2001. It is a generic referencing, i.e. the RP applies to 
drugs with the same active compound. The RP is initially set 16% lower than the 
branded product’s price. Over time, the Belgian government has progressively reduced 
the level of the RP. Generic substitution is allowed.  
 
Simoens, De Bruyn, Bogaert and Laekeman (2005; DES) analyze data on general trends 
and on evolution of particular drug classes. The former data are from IMS Health 
Belgium and relate to drug consumption of a representative panel of 2550 community 
pharmacies, about 50% of all Belgian pharmacies. The latter data are from Ifstat 
database, which brings together data on reimbursable drugs transmitted by community 
pharmacies to the third-party payer for the purpose of reimbursement. The authors 
observe that the introduction of the RP scheme in 2001 was associated with an increased 
market share of generic drugs, both in terms of volume and value. In terms of number of 
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pack sold, the average market share for generic drugs amounted to 2.05% of the total 
pharmaceutical market from January 1998 to June 2001, as compared with 6.11% from 
July 2001 to December 2003. The authors observe that, even though the volume of 
generic drugs sold rose substantially, the mandatory reduction in their prices means that 
the value of generic drugs sold increased at a slower rate, growing from 1.16% in 
January 1998 to June 2001, to 4.05% in July 2001 to December 2003. The authors also 
observe that, as new generic drugs were introduced in Belgium, their market share 
tended to increase during the first couple of months and then levelled off. The authors, 
for instance, report that the market share of generic drugs available during 2001 
increased during that year, partially as a consequence of the introduction of RP scheme 
in June 2001, but remained relatively constant around 5-6% in 2002, 2003 and the first 
half of 2004. The authors argue that rising market share of generic drugs in subsequent 
years can be attributed to the introduction of new generic drugs. The authors also 
observe that, in response to increased generic competition resulting from the 
introduction of the RP scheme, some manufacturers of original drugs launched new 
variants of their original drug, thereby effectively extending the period of patent 
protection. The authors, for instance, report the case of Cipramil, a selective serotonin 
reuptahe inhibitor that is based on the active principle citalopram: as generic drugs of 
citalopram became available on the Belgian market in March 2003, the pharmaceutical 
company introduced a new variant, Sipralexa. 
 
Hungary 
The first version of the RP was introduced in 1999. It was a generic referencing (i.e. RP 
applies to drugs with the same chemical). In 2003, a therapeutic referencing (i.e. RP 
applies to a cluster of chemicals) was introduced for some groups (including statins). 
The RP is the cheapest drug with a cumulative market share of 50%.  
 
Kalò, Muzbek, Bodrogi and Bidlò (2007; DES) analyze the Hungarian experience in 
introducing a therapeutic RP for statins in September 2003. The authors use as baseline 
period August 2003, the last month before the introduction of RP, and compare the 
average ex-factory and public prices, reimbursement level, patients’ co-payment and 
DDDs of prescribed units of statins with the ones in March 2004, using an IMS Health 
database built on sales reports of pharmaceutical wholesalers. The authors notice that as 
a consequence of the fact that the majority of DDD growth was driven by patented 
products such as atorvastatin and fluvastatin, the value market share of patented 
products was not significantly reduced. In fact, the market share of patented atorvastatin 
and fluvastatin was reduced only by 2.4%, while the 20.4% market share growth of 
generic simvastatin between August 2003 and March 2004 stemmed mainly from the 
reduced original simvastatin sales.  
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Norway  
A version of the RP was introduced in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent drugs already 
facing generic competition in six chemical substances targeted for depression, anti-
ulcer, allergy, high blood pressure and nigh cholesterol. It was a generic a therapeutic 
referencing (i.e. RP applies to a cluster of chemicals). The RP is an index price 
calculated as the sales-weighted sum of producer prices included in each sub-group. 
The government decided to terminate the system at the end of 2004. 
 
Brekke, Grasdal and Holmas (2008; BA) use a dataset from Farmastat providing 
information, over the four-year period from 2001 through 2004, on sales value (in 
pharmacy purchase price); volume (in DDD) for each package of drugs sold on the 
Norwegian pharmaceutical market; name, manufacturer, package size, dosage and 
launch date of each drug; and on whether the product was a brand-name or a generic 
drug. The authors observe a gradual increase in the sales of generic substitutes also 
before the RP introduction and notice that, during the months when RP was in place, the 
difference in market shares between branded and generic products was reduced 
considerably. The authors also argue that the negative cross-price effect on therapeutic 
substitutes outside the RP system may represent a potentially detrimental effect of RP, 
as it may affect the patent rents and thus potentially stifle innovation. 
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